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PATH DEPENDENCE IN TAX SUBSIDIES FOR HOME SALES
Lily Kahng*
ABSTRACT
At a time of looming fiscal crisis and virtual unanimity that tax
expenditures must be curtailed, tax subsidies for homeownership stand out
as among the most costly and unfair of these expenditures. As a result of
tax subsidies for homeownership, the government foregoes billions of
dollars in revenue each year, most of which benefits wealthy taxpayers.
Moreover, subsidies for homeownership encourage overinvestment in
housing and underinvestment in other business sectors, which impedes
economic productivity, jobs creation, and the ability of U.S. businesses to
compete in the global marketplace.
Scholars and commentators have analyzed extensively the tax subsidy
for home mortgage indebtedness but have paid little attention to tax
subsidies for home sales. This Article is the first to undertake a
comprehensive examination of tax subsidies relating to home sales. The
central thesis of this Article is that these subsidies rest upon questionable
policy justifications, flawed logical reasoning, and poor design choices. To
support this thesis, the Article traces the evolution of tax subsidies for home
sales from their surprising origins in a World War I-era tax preference for
requisitioned ships to their present incarnation as a practically unlimited
tax exemption. This narrative account leads to several important findings.
First, it shows how path dependence and bounded rationality have led
lawmakers and policymakers to make questionable decisions and support
problematic laws. Second, it demonstrates the power of the real estate
lobby to shape the story-and the resultant legal rules-from both tax and
social policy perspectives. Finally, it illuminates the political and
rhetoricalforces that have shaped tax subsidies for home sales. The Article
argues that only by understanding where we were before and how we got to
where we are now can we properly assess where we should go from here.
* Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For their helpful comments, I am grateful to
Steve Atkins, Gerald Auten, Adam Chodorow, Mary Louise Fellows, Charlene Luke, students in the
Spring 2013 Cornell Law School Tax Policy Seminar, and the participants of the 2013 Critical Tax
Conference at Hastings Law School and the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association. I
also wish to thank Cornell law librarian Dan Blackaby, Sandra Day O'Connor ASU law librarian David
Gay, and Seattle University law librarian Kelly Kunsch for their research assistance.
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In assessing tax subsidies for home sales, the Article evaluates the
subsidies by reference to the established tax policy criteria of efficiency
and fairness while remaining cognizant of the broader context of the social
and economic policies regarding homeownership. Although a
comprehensive assessment of federal housing policies and the role of tax
subsidies in structuring the domestic housing market lie beyond its scope,
the Article offers important new insights that will contribute significantly to
the ongoing policy dialogue about homeownership in our society. In
particular, it analyzes the economic impacts of tax subsidies for home
sales, including whether and to what extent the subsidies contributed to the
real estate bubble. Moreover, the Article highlights the important, but
underappreciated, disparate race and gender impacts of homeownership as
a wealth-building vehicle. Finally, the Article calls for the repeal of tax
subsidies for home sales and argues that the "exogenous shock" of the
globalfinancial crisis presents a rare and fleeting opportunity to effect this
reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Homeownership occupies a special place in the American psyche. In
the mid-twentieth century halcyon era of peace and prosperity, the
archetypal homeowner was a young married couple who would scrape
together the down payment to buy a modest "starter" house. Then, as the
husband advanced at work and children arrived, they would trade up,
perhaps more than once, to a bigger and finer house. Finally, when the
children had left the nest and the husband retired, the couple, with their
mortgage paid off, would downsize and have a handsome amount left over
to enjoy in their golden years.
In recent decades, the narrative around homeownership has changed.
At the height of the housing bubble, the availability of easy credit and the
prospect of seemingly limitless appreciation fueled a "get rich quick"
mentality, in which the primary purpose of buying a home was to resell it at
a handy profit. The American dream of homeownership metamorphosed
from Leave It to Beaver to Flip This House.
The tax law has mirrored this shifting narrative through tax subsidies
for home sales. At first, the law allowed a homeowner to defer paying the
tax on a home sale as long as he bought a series of increasingly expensive
houses.' Later, Congress added a one-time tax exemption on the deferred
gain for homeowners who were fifty-five years or older and ready to
downsize.2 Then, in 1997, roughly coincident with the start of the housing
bubble, Congress drastically changed the subsidy for home sales,
exempting almost all gains from home sales. The tax benefits of house
flipping became, as one lobbyist proclaimed, "almost too good to be true."4
This Article is the first to comprehensively examine tax subsidies for
home sales.5 Its central thesis is that these subsidies for home sales rest
1. I.R.C. § 1034 (1994) (repealed 1997).
2. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 404(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2869.
3. I.R.C. § 121(a) (1994) (amended 1997).
4. John Adams, Tax Benefits of Homeownership Are Almost Too Good to Be True,
REALTOR.COM, http://www.realtor.com/basics/buy/closepossess/taxbenefits.asp (last visited Aug. 21,
2013).
5. The tax law provides a variety of tax subsidies for homeownership, the largest of which are the
nontaxation of imputed rental income (including the home mortgage interest deduction), the deduction
for real property taxes, and the exclusion of gain from home sales. See Larry Ozanne, Taxation of
Owner-Occupied and Rental Housing 4-6 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 2012-14, 2012).
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upon questionable policy justifications, flawed logical reasoning, and poor
design choices. To support this thesis, the Article traces the evolution of tax
subsidies for home sales from their surprising origins in a World War I-era
tax preference for requisitioned ships to their present incarnation as a
practically unlimited tax exemption. This narrative account leads to several
important findings. First, it shows how path dependence and bounded
rationality have led lawmakers and policymakers to make questionable
decisions and support problematic laws. Second, it demonstrates the power
of the real estate lobby to shape the story-and the resultant legal
rules-from both tax and social policy perspectives. Finally, it illuminates
the political and rhetorical forces that have shaped tax subsidies for home
sales. The Article argues that only by understanding where we were before
Most of the legal scholarship on these subsidies has focused primarily on the home mortgage interest
deduction. See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 329 (2009)
(describing how tax subsidies for homeownership disproportionately benefit wealthy white taxpayers);
Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000) (arguing that the home mortgage interest deduction
encourages suburban sprawl); Leo P. Martinez & Jennifer M. Martinez, The Internal Revenue Code and
Latino Realities: A Critical Perspective, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 377 (2011) (describing how the
home mortgage interest deduction benefits whites more than Latinos); William T. Mathias, Curtailing
the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43 (1996)
(criticizing the home mortgage interest deduction as unfair, inefficient, and costly); Beverly 1. Moran &
William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 751, 772-83
(1996) (describing how whites benefit more than blacks from tax subsidies for homeownership);
Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How and Why the
Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751 (2012) (arguing that the
home mortgage interest deduction is unfair, inefficient, and costly); John A. Powell, How Government
Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially Segregated America, in TAXING AMERICA 80, 92-95 (Karen
B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (describing how whites benefit more than blacks from tax
subsidies for homeownership); Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of
Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157 (2005) (describing how the mortgage interest
deduction disproportionately benefits suburban homeowners as opposed to urban homeowners); Dennis
J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage
Interest, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2010, at 233 (providing a historical account of the home
mortgage interest deduction and arguing that the deduction is unfair, inefficient, and costly).
This Article is first to provide an in-depth analysis and critique of the tax subsidies related to home
sales, including the current law on gain exclusion for home sales. Most of the prior research on these
subsidies focuses on relatively narrow practical and planning issues related to the exclusion. See, e.g.,
Steven C. Dilley & Debra S. Callihan, Planning Ideas for Sale of a Residence, 80 TAX NOTES 949
(1998); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Multiple Homes but No Principal Residence?, 99 TAX
NOTES 1363 (2003). There is one thoughtful policy critique of tax subsidies for home sales, but it
predates the major changes made to the law in 1997 and does not address the current law gain
exclusion. See Christine A. Klein, A Requiem for the Rollover Rule: Capital Gains, Farmland Loss, and
the Law of Unintended Consequences, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 406-07 (1998) (arguing that
I.R.C. § 1034 unintentionally promoted overinvestment in housing and conversion of farmland into
suburban housing). A more recent article provides a policy critique of the current law on gain exclusion
for home sales. See Bradford P. Anderson, Welcome to My Flipperhood: A Call to Repair the
Residential Real Estate Tax Swindle, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 419 (2009) ("The current housing
and financial sector meltdown is not the result of a market failure, but is the natural, necessary, and
presumably unintended result of the tax preferences extended to residential real estate in 1997.").
However, it provides no analysis of the legislative and political history of the provision; nor does it
consider any of the extensive economic research related to tax subsidies for homeownership.
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and how we got to where we are now can we properly assess where we
should go from here.
In assessing tax subsidies for home sales, the Article evaluates the
subsidies by reference to the established tax policy criteria of efficiency
and fairness while remaining cognizant of the broader context of the social
and economic policies regarding homeownership. Although a
comprehensive assessment of federal housing policies and the role of tax
subsidies in structuring the domestic housing market lie beyond its scope,
the Article offers important new insights that will contribute significantly
to the ongoing policy dialogue about homeownership in our society. In
particular, it provides an analysis of the economic impacts of tax subsidies
for home sales, including whether and to what extent the subsidies
contributed to the real estate bubble. Moreover, the Article highlights the
important, but underappreciated, disparate race and gender impacts of
homeownership as a wealth-building vehicle. Finally, the Article calls for
the repeal of tax subsidies for home sales and argues that the "exogenous
shock" of the global financial crisis presents a rare and fleeting opportunity
to effect this reform.
Part I provides a brief history of tax subsidies for home sales. Part II
uses this history to analyze the ways in which path dependence and
bounded rationality have shaped the law in ways that have led to dubious
choices and undesirable outcomes. It then discusses the ways in which
politics and the influence of interest groups contributed to the evolution of
the law. Part III reassesses the law and questions the assumptions and
choices that led to its enactment. It also addresses important and unforeseen
consequences of the law that have yet fully to be understood. Part IV
provides a broader framework for assessment, one that takes account of
systemic incentives under the tax law and also considers the role of
homeownership as a means to promote race and gender equality in the
distribution of wealth. The Article concludes with proposals for reform and
assesses the likelihood of such reform.
1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAx SUBSIDIES FOR HOME SALES
A. The Rollover Regime
1. Rollover
From 1951 through 1997, I.R.C. § 1034 provided for the
nonrecognition of gain upon the sale of a principal residence, as long as the
taxpayer purchased another principal residence of equal or greater value
191
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within a specified time period before or after the date of the sale.6 (The
requirement that the taxpayer reinvest in similar property-another
principal residence in the case of I.R.C. § 1034-is called a "rollover"
requirement in the vernacular.) I.R.C. § 1034 did not exempt the gain from
tax but rather deferred- it by giving the taxpayer a basis in the new residence
equal to his basis in the old residence.
Conceptually, I.R.C. § 1034 had its antecedents in two other rollover
provisions: I.R.C. § 1031, relating to like-kind exchanges, and I.R.C.
§ 1033, relating to involuntary conversions. Both of these allow for the
deferral of gain as long as the taxpayer ends up with an investment in
similar property.8
6. See I.R.C. § 1034 (1994), repealed by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§ 312(b), I11 Stat. 788, 839. As originally enacted, the specified time period for reinvestment in a new
residence under I.R.C. § 1034 was within one year before or after the sale of the old residence. See
Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 318, 65 Stat. 452, 494. This time period was lengthened to
18 months before or after the sale of the old residence in 1975 (Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-12, § 1034, 89 Stat. 26, 32 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)) and then
lengthened again to two years before or after the sale of the old residence in 1981 (Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 1034, 95 Stat. 172, 197 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.)). Also, as originally enacted, the deferral could be used only once per year. See
Revenue Act of 1951 § 318. This was changed to restrict the use of the deferral to once every two years,
unless the home sale was due to a change in employment. See I.R.C. § 1034(d).
7. See I.R.C. § 1034(e). As a practical matter, when combined with other provisions, the deferral
often results in permanent exclusion. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 5, at 417 (noting that the one-time
exclusion under prior law I.R.C. § 121 and nonrecognition of gain on transfers at death under I.R.C.
§ 1014 allowed deferred gains to be excluded entirely); Ventry, supra note 5, at 259 (same).
8. The technical aspects of I.R.C. §§ 1031 and 1033 vary somewhat from 1.R.C. § 1034, although
all three provisions embody the rollover concept: I.R.C. § 1031 requires that the property be exchanged
for "like-kind" property. See I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2006). I.R.C. § 1033 requires either that property be
exchanged for property "similar or related in service or use" or that sale proceeds received on
conversion be reinvested in similar use property within a specified time period. See .R.C. § 1033(a)
(2006).
More broadly, all three of these rollover provisions are grounded in the idea that a continued investment
in similar property justifies an exception to the normal realization rules. Many scholars have concluded
that this rationale for the rollover provisions is shaky at best. See Fred B. Brown, Proposal to Reform
the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion Rules in Light of Fundamental Tax Policies: A Simpler,
More Rational and More Unified Approach, 67 Mo. L. REV. 705 (2002) (criticizing §§ 1031 and 1033
as inefficient, inequitable, and costly to administer); Erik M. Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for
Special Treatment ofLike-Kind Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 193 (1985) (criticizing the efficiency
and administrability rationales for I.R.C. § 1031 but endorsing the illiquidity rationale); Calvin H.
Johnson, Impose Capital Gains Tax on Like-Kind Exchanges, 121 TAX NOTES 475 (2008) (arguing that
the fairness, efficiency, and administrability arguments in favor of I.R.C. § 1031 are not persuasive in
light of revenue needs); Marjorie E. Komhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 397 (1987) (detailing political and legislative history of I.R.C. § 1031 and critiquing the
provision on policy grounds); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis ofRealization and Recognition
Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. I (1992). But see Cynthia Blum, Rollover: An
Alternative Treatment of Capital Gains, 41 TAX L. REv. 385, 399-409 (1986) (proposing to extend
rollover treatment to all realized capital gains to alleviate inefficiencies and inequities created by
realization-based taxation).
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I.R.C. § 1034 also owed much to the rhetoric of wartime exigency that
accompanied the enactment of I.R.C. § 1033.9 I.R.C. § 1033 had been
adopted in 1921 to address the government requisition of ships during
World War 1.10 The rationale for the provision was that it would have been
unfair to impose a tax on involuntary dispositions and to deplete the ship
owners' funds available to replace their ships." Thirty years later,
lawmakers relied on the rationale to justify the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 1034.12 The analogy seems strained-the country was not at war in
1951,13 and house sales are not ship seizures. Nonetheless, the Report of
Committee on Ways & Means states that a home sale to change jobs or
accommodate a larger family "partakes of the nature of an involuntary
conversion"; that such sales are "particularly numerous in periods of rapid
change such as mobilization or reconversion."1 4 The Report notes further
that I.R.C. § 1034 would not be limited to these situations, but instead
would apply to all home sales, reasoning that it would be too difficult to
administer a provision limited to "involuntary conversion" sales.15
2. One-Time Exclusion
I.R.C. § 1034, by allowing gain deferral as long as a homeowner traded
up to a house equal or greater in value, subsidized the first stages of the
idealized homeownership lifecycle: homeowners would raise their growing
families in a series of larger and more expensive houses while at the same
time increasing their wealth through homeownership, all without paying
any tax. However, it also created a new problem in the latter phase of the
lifecycle: with an empty nest and retirement impending, the married couple
would want to cash out the savings in their home by downsizing. All those
years of trading up to bigger and better houses, all the while retaining the
9. See Klein, supra note 5, at 420-24 (documenting the connection between I.R.C. §§ 1033 and
1034).
10. See id. at 420. To be precise, the 1921 provision allowed a deduction for converted property.
See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, §§ 214(a)(12), 234(a)(14), 42 Stat. 227, 241, 257. It was
replaced in 1924 by the nonrecognition provision that has been in effect with certain modifications
since then. See Revenue Act, Pub. L.No. 68-176, § 203(b)(5), 43 Stat. 253, 256 (1924).
11. See John R. Dorocak, Protecting Real Estate Investors: The Fight to Maintain the Like-Kind
Standard for Exchanges Under IR.C. Section 1031- "You Don't Have to Call Me Darling, Darling,"
33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571, 594-95 (1993); Klein, supra note 5, at 420-21.
12. See Klein, supra note 5, at 421-24. Christine Klein notes the widespread support of I.R.C.
§ 1034 among lawmakers, along with the paucity of legislative history on the provision. She speculates
that lawmakers supported the provision in part because it afforded a welcome moment of consensus
during a highly contentious legislative session. See id. at 433.
13. On the other hand, World War II exerted an enormous influence on tax law and policy for
many years. See generally JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAx 110-54 (1985).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 27 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781, 1808.
15. See id. at 28.
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historic basis of that first starter house, created the potential for a sizeable
gain.
The problem was short-lived: in 1964, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 121.16
The new law allowed a one-time exclusion of up to $20,000 of the gain
from a home sale, provided the taxpayer was at least sixty-five years old at
the time of the sale and had owned and used the property as his or her
principal residence for at least five of the eight years preceding the sale.'7
The rationale for the exclusion was that it would impose an undue hardship
on elderly taxpayers to tax them when they might need the funds for living
expenses:
While present law generally provides adequately for the younger
individual who is for one reason or another changing residences, it
does not do so for the elderly person whose family has grown and
who no longer has need for the family homestead. Such an
individual may desire to purchase a less expensive home or move
to an apartment or to a rental property at another location. He may
also require some or all of the funds obtained from the sale of the
old residence to meet his and his wife's living expenses.
Nevertheless, under present law, such an individual must tie up all
of his investment from the old residence in a new residence, if he is
to avoid taxation on any of the gain which may be involved.
Your committee concluded that this is an undesirable burden on
our elderly taxpayers.' 8
What lawmakers failed to note is that elderly taxpayers owning homes
with large built-in gains-that is, high value and low basis-were exactly
the taxpayers who were likely to have availed themselves of I.R.C. § 1034
during their years as homeowners. Thus, the new exclusion bestowed
another tax benefit on those who had already benefitted from deferral under
I.R.C. § 1034.19
Initially, the one-time exclusion was relatively modest. 20 Originally
designed to address "the average and smaller homestead selling for $20,000
16. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 206(a), 78 Stat. 19, 38-40.
17. See I.R.C. § 121 (1970) (prior to amendment in 1976).
18. H.R. REP. No. 88-749, at 45 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1354.
19. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., THE TAX TREATMENT OF HOMEOWNERSHIP: ISSUES
AND OPTIONS 16-17 (1981) ("[Tihe exclusion converts the continuing, interest-free loan on tax
liabilities that the deferral provides into a permanent forgiveness of tax liabilities. It thus compounds the
favorable tax treatment created by the deferral of capital gains on home sales.").
20. Even at its initial modest level, the exclusion caused concern:
The new exclusion for gains from the sale of residences by senior citizens seems ill-
advised. As is the case with so many tax exemptions, the new exclusion appears to be a
generous gesture when it is viewed in isolation. Upon comparative consideration, however,
its true preferential character emerges. There is no particular reason why wealthy persons
194 [Vol. 65:1:187
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or less," 2 1 it applied only to the gain attributable to the first $20,000 of the
selling price.22 However, from 1964 to 1997, Congress amended the
exclusion several times to make it more generous-increasing the amount
of gain eligible for the exclusion,23 lowering the age requirement,24 and
decreasing the required time periods of ownership and use.25 Until 1997, a
taxpayer could exclude up to $125,000 ($62,500 in the case of married
persons filing separately) of gain on a home sale, provided he or she was at
least fifty-five years of age at the time of sale and had owned and used the
property as his or her principal residence for three of the five years
preceding the sale. 26 Despite the enhanced generosity of the one-time
exclusion, it continued to be restricted to one-time use.27
B. The 1997 Law
1. Rollover Regime Repealed and Gain Exclusion Enacted
With the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (1997 Act), the tax treatment of
home sales underwent a major change: Congress repealed I.R.C. § 1034
should not shoulder their proportionate share of the tax burden regardless of age. The
exemption of a person from the income tax on the basis of age rather than economic status is
difficult to justify.
Charles L. B. Lowndes, The Revenue Act of 1964: A Critical Analysis, 1964 DUKE L.J. 667, 687-88
(1964).
21. H.R. REP. No. 88-749, at 46. In 2012 dollars, $20,000 would be roughly $148,500. See U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI Inflation Calculator,
http://www.bls.gov/datalinflation-calculator.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2013). However, housing prices
have increased at a much greater rate than inflation: In 1964, the median and average sales price for a
new home was $18,900 and $20,500, respectively. In 2007, when housing prices peaked, the median
and average was $247,900 and $313,600, respectively. As of 2010, the most recent year available, the
average and median was $221,800 and $272,900, respectively. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, Median and Average Sales Price of New Homes Sold in the United States,
http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).
22. See I.R.C. § 121 (1970) (prior to amendment in 1976). If the selling price was greater than
$20,000, the taxpayer could exclude a part of the gain that corresponded to the proportion between
$20,000 and the selling price. See id. Thus, for example, if a taxpayer sold a house for $30,000, in
which he had a $5,000 basis, for a gain of $25,000, he would be able to exclude only two-thirds
($20,000/$30,000), or $16,667, of the gain. Mathematically, the exclusion amount could never exceed
$20,000.
23. See Revenue Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1404(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1733 (increasing
exclusion amount to $35,000); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 404(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2869
(increasing exclusion amount to $100,000 ($50,000 in the case of married persons filing separately));
Tax Incentive Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 123, 95 Stat. 172, 197 (increasing exclusion amount to
$125,000 ($62,500 in the case of married persons filing separately)).
24. See Revenue Act of 1978 § 404(a) (reducing age requirement to fifty-five).
25. See id. § 404(c)(1), (2), at 2870 (reducing the required period of use and ownership as the
taxpayer's principal residence to three of the five years preceding the sale).
26. See I.R.C. § 121 (1994) (amended 1997).
27. See id.
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and greatly expanded and liberalized I.R.C. § 121.28 (This Article refers to
the prior law rollover provision of I.R.C. § 1034 and the one-time exclusion
of I.R.C. §121 as the "rollover regime." It refers to current law I.R.C. § 121
to as the "gain exclusion.") Under the new gain exclusion, the maximum
amount of the exclusion was set at $250,000 ($500,000 for married couples
filing a joint return), doubling the exclusion amount for unmarried
taxpayers, and quadrupling it for married couples. 29 The use and ownership
requirement was reduced to two of the five years preceding the sale (the
"two-of-five use and ownership requirement"). 30 And most importantly, the
gain exclusion was no longer limited to one-time use by taxpayers fifty-five
years of age or older-it could now be used repeatedly, not more than once
every two years, by the same taxpayer, without regard to the age.31
Lawmakers offered a variety of rationales for adopting the generous
new provision.32 First, they argued the rollover regime imposed too great
an administrative burden on taxpayers. Noting that "many taxpayers buy
and sell a number of homes over the course of a lifetime," the Report of the
Committee on Ways & Means (1997 House Report) bemoans the
homeowner's difficult task of keeping track of his basis in his house, a task
that stretched back in time "in most cases, for many decades." The Report
ignores the fact that the reason that homeowners had to keep track of basis
"for many decades" was that I.R.C. § 1034 had allowed them to defer the
gain on the multiple home sales they had made during those decades. It
does, however, note that the recordkeeping often ends up being needless
because "most homeowners never pay any income tax on the capital gain
on their principal residences, as a result of the rollover provisions and the
$125,000 one-time exclusion." 34 Stated more simply, the rationale seemed
28. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312, 111 Stat. 788, 836-41.
29. Under prior law, a married couple was allowed only one exclusion of S 125,000. See I.R.C.
§ 121 (b)(1) (amended 1997). There is no explanation of why the exclusion amount was raised so
substantially. See id. Particularly for married couples, the new exclusion amount greatly exceeded the
average and median selling price for new homes in 1997 ($146,000 and $172,000, respectively). See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Median and Average Sales Price of New Homes
Sold in the United States, http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).
30. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 312.
31. See id. The limitation on use of the exclusion to once every two years (the "two-year
limitation") is similar to the two-year limitation on the use of the rollover provision. See I.R.C.
§ 121(b)(3) (2006); I.R.C. § 1034 (1994) (repealed 1997). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 346-49 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 740-43.
33. See id. at 347, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 741. House Report 148 also discusses the
difficulty of distinguishing between capital home improvement expenditures, which increase basis, and
home repair expenditures which do not. See id.
34. See id.
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to be, why require all this recordkeeping when we know no one's going to
pay tax anyway?35
Another rationale for the new law had to do with the undesirable
incentive effects of the rollover provision. Because it required a taxpayer to
reinvest the sale proceeds from his old house in a new house of equal or
greater value in order to achieve complete deferral, it encouraged people to
purchase increasingly expensive homes, promoting "an inefficient use of
taxpayer's [sic] financial resources," particularly when people moved from
a higher-cost to lower-cost region of the country. 36
A third rationale offered for the gain exclusion was that the one-time
exclusion impaired the mobility of elderly taxpayers who might "choose to
stay in their homes even though the home no longer suits their needs"37
rather than sell their homes and pay tax on the gains.
Finally, in support of the gain exclusion, the 1997 House Report cites
potential "traps for the unwary," that would be eliminated, such as the loss
of the one-time exclusion that resulted from marrying someone who had
already made use of the exclusion; the unexpected gain that might result
from moving from a high-cost region of the country to a low-cost region;
and the unexpected gains that might befall a divorcing couple.39
2. Procedural Change
The 1997 Act made one other obscure change related to I.R.C. § 121: it
amended I.R.C. § 6045 to exempt most home sales from the reporting
requirements of that provision.
35. Restating the argument this way is not entirely facetious. Tax commentator Lee Sheppard
articulated the argument in similar fashion when she expressed support for a 1991 proposal to exclude
gains on home sales:
This leads to the first reason why this legislation is good, to wit, why not be honest about it?
We are not serious about gains taxation on sales of personal residences, so why make people
jump through hoops to qualify for an exclusion? It is vastly simpler to just exempt these
sales from taxation.
Lee A. Sheppard, Should Sales of Personal Residences Be Exempt from Tax?, 50 TAX NOTES 1433,
1433 (1991).
36. See H.R. REP.No. 105-148, at 347, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 741.
37. Id.
38. House Report 148 overlooks the fact that this group of taxpayers has already benefitted from
life-long deferral plus a one-time exemption, so that much, if not all, of their taxable gain would have
accrued relatively recently, and would likely not be substantial. Also, there was no attempt to
distinguish between more needy elderly taxpayers-for example, those who might need to go into
assisted living or move closer to family members who could provide care-and those who might want
to relocate purely out of personal preference.
39. See H.R. REP. No. 105-148, at 348, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 742. The
characterization of these as "traps for the unwary" is questionable. Rather, these seem to be logical
consequences of the law as it was intended to operate.
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I.R.C. § 6045 requires brokers to report to the IRS information
regarding their customers' transactions, including names, addresses, and
gross proceeds.40 Congress had explicitly extended it to apply to real estate
transactions in 1986 with the enactment of a new subsection, I.R.C.
§ 6045(e).41 I.R.C. § 6045(e) requires a "real estate reporting person" to
provide to the IRS and the seller of the property a form which contains the
seller's name, address, and taxpayer identification number; a general
description of the property; the closing date; and the gross proceeds of the
sale.42 A real estate reporting person is defined to be the person responsible
for closing the transaction, such as the attorney or title company, or in the
absence of such person, a person such as the mortgage lender, the seller's
broker, the buyer's broker, or another person involved in the transaction.43
The 1997 Act amended I.R.C. § 6045(e) to exempt a real estate
reporting person from the obligation to file an information return if (1) the
selling price was no greater than the exclusion amount ($250,000 for an
unmarried seller; $500,000 for a married seller), and (2) the seller provided
a written assurance that the property was the seller's principal residence
and that the entire gain was excludable under I.R.C. § 121.44
The 1997 House Report's stated reason for the broker reporting
exemption is perfunctory: "The Committee believes that informational
returns should not generally be required on sales of personal residences
where the sales price does not exceed the amount eligible to be excluded
from income." Perhaps the impetus for the exemption derived from
40. Broker reporting has been part of the tax law almost since its inception. See Joseph J.
Thomdike, Wall Street, Washington, and the Business of Information Reporting, TAX HISTORY
PROJECT (Feb. 13, 2006), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/
A518AE7D8D5EAF23852571360068FC5E?OpenDocument (providing a history of broker reporting
laws from initial enactment in 1917 to present). However, the industries subject to broker reporting had
always opposed it, and it was not until 1982, with the enactment of an explicit directive to the IRS to
promulgate regulations, that the IRS felt empowered to implement it. See id; see also Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 311, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 600 [hereinafter TEFRA];
John S. Nolan, Comments on the Tax Compliance Act of 1982, 15 TAX NOTES 699, 706 (1982).
TEFRA's most important provision, which imposed withholding on interest and dividends, was
repealed retroactively and never took effect. See Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the
United States and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REv. 315, 325-26 (2010).
41. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1521, 100 Stat. 2085, 2746-47. Although the
prior law seems to have been broad enough to encompass real estate transactions, the IRS had only
issued regulations relating to securities, regulated futures contracts, commodities, and precious metals.
Because Congress was concerned that real estate transactions were not being properly reported on tax
returns, it enacted I.R.C. § 6045(e) to give the IRS an explicit authorization to require information
reporting for real estate transactions. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 1282 (Comm. Print 1987).
42. I.R.C. § 6045(a), (e) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-4 (2013).
43. I.R.C. § 6045(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-4.
44. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312(c), 111 Stat. 788, 839 (adding I.R.C.
§ 6045(e)).
45. H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 421, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 822. The Conference
Report is silent as to the reasons for the broker reporting exemption. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-220, at
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antipathy towards the IRS and its intrusiveness into taxpayers' lives,
exemplified by Dole's presidential campaign pledge to "end the I.R.S. as
we know it,'A6 and stop the "K.G.B.-like life style audits." 7 This antipathy
culminated in a sweeping curtailment of IRS enforcement and collection
powers in 1998.48 As Linda Goold, tax counsel for the National Association
of Realtors, said about the Dole and Clinton proposals to expand the
exclusion of home sale gains, "It's the ultimate 'get the I.R.S. out of your
life' provision." The broker reporting exemption went even further in
keeping the IRS out of taxpayers' lives: not only would taxpayers pay no
tax on gains from home sales and be relieved of basis recordkeeping; in
addition, the IRS would not even know that they had sold their houses.
C. Other Aspects of the Gain Exclusion
1. Basic Requirements and Special Rules
To meet the two-of-five use and ownership requirement of I.R.C.
§ 121, a taxpayer must have used and owned the property as his or her
principal residence for periods aggregating at least two years during the
five years ending on the date of the sale.50 The periods of use and
ownership do not have to be simultaneous.5' Determining whether a
property is the taxpayer's principal residence, and for how long the
taxpayer has used it and owned it as such is a complex inquiry that
incorporates prior law as well as extensive regulations under I.R.C. § 121.52
480-81 (1997) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt220/pdflCRPT-
105hrpt220.pdf.
46. Katharine Q. Seelye, Dole Offers Economic Plan Calling for Broad Tax Cut Aimed at
Spurring Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 1996) (quoting Bob Dole), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/
06/us/dole-offers-economic-plan-calling-for-broad-tax-cut-aimed-at-spurring-growth.html.
47. Id.
48. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112
Stat. 685.
49. See Nick Ravo, Capital Gains Change Could Be Bonanza for Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 1996) (quoting Linda Goold), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/22/business/capital-gains-
change-could-be-bonanza-for-homeowners.html.
50. 1.R.C. § 12 1(a) (2006). In the case of married couples filing a joint return, in order to qualify
for the $500,000 exclusion, only one spouse need satisfy the ownership component of the two-of-five
ownership requirement, but both spouses must satisfy the use component. I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A). Failing
this, each spouse will be eligible for the individual taxpayer exclusion if he or she otherwise meets the
requirements for the exclusion. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(B).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-l(c)(1) (2002).
52. See Steven C. Dilley & Debra S. Callihan, Implications of the Proposed Regs on Sale of a
Residence, 91 TAX NOTEs 108, 108-11 (2001) (describing prior law and possible applicability to new
I.R.C. § 121); Raby & Raby, supra note 5, at 1363-67 (discussing prior law definition of principal
residence as it applies to new I.R.C. § 121).
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Under the two-year limitation, the gain exclusion cannot be used more
than once every two years.53 In the absence of the two-year limitation, a
taxpayer with multiple residences-who otherwise satisfied the two-of-five
use and ownership requirement for those multiple residences-could claim
multiple exclusions within a shorter time period.54
The two-of-five use and ownership requirement and the two-year
limitation are relaxed in cases where the taxpayer sells or exchanges his
house due to a change in place of employment, health, or unforeseen
circumstances.s In these cases, the maximum amount of the exclusion is
reduced in proportion to the amount of time the taxpayer owned and used
the property as his principal residence.56
In addition, I.R.C. § 121(d) contains special rules relating to property
of a deceased spouse; property transferred to an individual by a spouse or
former spouse incident to divorce; property used by a former spouse
pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument; tenant-stockholders in a
cooperative housing corporation; gains attributable to depreciation;
involuntary conversions; taxpayers who become physically or mentally
incapable of self-care; sales of remainder interests; expatriates; and
property acquired from a decedent.s?
2. Anti-Avoidance Measures
Since the 1997 Act, Congress has enacted two anti-avoidance
provisions in response to perceived abuses of the gain exclusion. The first,
enacted in 2004, addresses a strategy that enabled a taxpayer to use the gain
exclusion to shelter gains attributable to property held for investment or use
in a trade or business.58 Typically, the taxpayer would exchange such
property for new property in a like-kind exchange governed by I.R.C.
§ 1031. Under that provision, the taxpayer would not recognize gain with
respect to the old property, but the gain would be preserved by assigning
him a basis in the new property that would be equal to the basis in the old
property. The taxpayer would then convert the new property to use as his
principal residence for two years, and then sell it and exclude the gain
53. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(3).
54. For example, suppose taxpayer T owned Tara and Graceland for five years and lived first in
Tara for two-and-a-half years and then in Graceland for two-and-a-half years. In the absence of the two-
year limitation, T could sell both Tara and Graceland at the end of the five-year period and exclude the
gain from both.
55. See I.R.C. § 121(c)(2).
56. See I.R.C. § 121(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(g) (2004). For example, if T, a single taxpayer,
owned and used Manderley for six months and sold it due to employment relocation, the maximum
exclusion amount would be one quarter (.5 years /2 years) of the full $250,000 exclusion amount.
57. For a discussion of these special rules, see Dilley & Callihan, supra note 5.
58. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 840(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1597.
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under I.R.C. § 121.59 To address this perceived abuse, a special rule
provides that where a taxpayer has acquired property in a like-kind
exchange, he cannot use the gain exclusion upon subsequent sale of the
property unless he has owned the property for at least five years. 60
The second anti-avoidance provision, enacted in 2008, is intended to
address the perceived abuse in which a taxpayer would convert a vacation
home or investment property to use as his principal residence for two years
and then sell the home. In the absence of a special rule, the taxpayer would
be able to use the gain exclusion to shelter gains attributable to the period
he had used the property as a vacation home or investment property. Under
the anti-avoidance provision, a taxpayer who otherwise qualifies for the
gain exclusion must recognize the portion of gain allocable to certain
periods for which he owned a property but did not use it as his principal
residence.
II. How DID WE GET HERE?
This Part uses the history of tax subsidies for home sales developed in
Part I to analyze the ways in which path dependence and bounded
rationality have shaped the law, leading to dubious choices and undesirable
outcomes. It then highlights the ways in which politics and the influence of
interest groups contributed to the evolution of the law.
A. Path Dependence and Bounded Rationality
1. The Basic Concepts
At its most general, "path dependence means that where we go next
depends not only on where we are now, but also upon where we have been.
History matters." 62 More specifically, "the crucial feature of a historical
59. Bradley T. Borden & Alex Hamrick, Like-Kind Exchanges of Personal-Use Residences, 119
TAX NOTES 1253, 1256 (2008); Gail Levin Richmond, Section 121(d)(10): An Article Addressing an
Article, 106 TAX NOTES 797, 799-800 (2005).
60. See I.R.C. § 121(d)(10).
61. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(4)[B].
62. Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 981, 981 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). See generally BRIAN W. ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS
AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of
QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332 (1985) [hereinafter David, Clio]; Paul A. David, Path Dependence:
A Foundational Concept for Historical Social Science, 1 CLIOMETRICA: J. HIST. ECON. & ECON. HIST.
91 (2007). There are critics of this loose meaning of path dependence. See, e.g., Scott E. Page, Path
Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87, 87 (2006) ("This wider application of path dependence has dulled its




process that generates path dependence is positive feedback (or self-
reinforcement). Given this feature, each step in a particular direction makes
it more difficult to reverse course."63
The QWERTY keyboard is the paradigmatic example of path
dependence and its consequences.64 The keyboard happened to gain
popularity in the early days of the typewriter due to a minor and short-lived
advantage it had over other keyboard designs.6 5 The more prevalent it
became, the more beneficial it was for users to learn how to use it, and the
more difficult it became to induce users to switch to an arguably superior
design.66 In this way, a keyboard design that is inferior to others has
become the standard.
According to Paul Pierson and other political scientists, path
dependence operates with similar effects on decisions and outcomes in the
context of political processes.68 Pierson theorizes that the temporal
dimension of politics is crucial to understanding political outcomes, that
instead of taking a "snapshot" view of political life, it is necessary to
"situat[e] particular moments (including the present) in a temporal
sequence of events and processes stretching over extended periods."69 He
describes how path dependence results in self-reinforcing effects of early
steps down a particular path:
In the presence of positive feedback, the probability of further steps
along the same path increases with each move down that path. This
is because the relative benefits of the current activity compared
63. PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 21 (2004).
64. See David, Clio, supra note 62.
65. In Paul David's account, the QWERTY keyboard addressed a short-lived problem in the early
design of the manual typewriter-it helped keep the keys from jamming-while a different keyboard,
designed by Dvorak, enabled faster typing. See id. at 333-34. This account has been disputed. See Stan
J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. I (1990). Nonetheless, it is
still widely cited as an intuitive example of path dependence. See The QWERTY Myth, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 3, 1999, at 67 (noting QWERTY has achieved "iconic eminence" even though it is a myth).
66. See David, Clio, supra note 62, at 334-36.
67. See Id. at 332, 336.
68. See PIERSON, supra note 63; Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the
Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000); see also Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the
'Carriers of History'?: Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations, and
Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 205 (1994); James Mahoney, Path
Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY & Soc'Y 507 (2000); B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre &
Desmond S. King, The Politics ofPath Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism, 67
J. POL. 1275 (2005); Sven Steinmo, Historic Institutionalism, in APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 118 (Donatella della Porta & Michael Keating eds., 2008); Kathleen Thelen,
How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis, in COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 208 (James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003);
Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, in
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, (Sven Steinmo
et al eds., 1992).
69. See PIERSON, supra note 63, at 2.
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with once-possible options increases over time. To put it a different
way, the costs of switching to some previously plausible alternative
rise. 0
The concept of bounded rationality is simple but powerful: people have
finite cognitive resources and therefore need to ration them in
decisionmaking processes. 7 They may accomplish this by limiting the
information and choices they consider or by relying on heuristic
"shortcuts."72 In recent years, scholars have invoked bounded rationality to
explain why the United States has had such different reactions to terrorism
and global climate change; 73 why standard form contracts are often
inefficient;74 and why myriad aspects of law are affected by lawmakers'
"limited capacities for productive thinking."75
2. Path Dependence, Bounded Rationality, and Tax Subsidies for
Home Sales
As Part I has described, the original subsidy for home sales-the
rollover provision of I.R.C. § 1034-was justified by a dubious analogy to
wartime ship seizures.76 This was the first, ill-considered step on the path of
tax subsidies for home sales. Once in place, I.R.C. § 1034 gave rise to a
new phenomenon: taxpayers who had taken advantage of deferral over
many years and through multiple rollovers would face large gains when
they downsized. The characterization of this as an unfair hardship for
elderly taxpayers obscured the fact that this very group-elderly taxpayers
who owned homes with high values and low bases-were exactly the
individuals who were likely to have availed themselves of I.R.C. § 1034
during their years as homeowners. Thus, with the one-time exclusion,
lawmakers bestowed yet another tax benefit on those who had already
benefitted from deferral under I.R.C. § 1034.77
70. Id. at 21.
71. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 104-05
(1955); see also James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9
BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69
AM. ECON. REv. 493 (1979); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment,
63 PSYCHOL. REv. 129 (1956).
72. See Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1331-32 (2003).
73. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2007).
74. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203 (2003).
75. See Hirsch, supra note 72, at 1337.
76. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
77. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE TAX TREATMENT OF HOMEOWNERSHIP: ISSUES AND
OPTIONS 15-16 (1981) ("[T]he exclusion converts the continuing, interest-free loan on tax liabilities
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From a bounded rationality perspective, the one-time exclusion made
some sense-elderly taxpayers who had deferred gains for many years
would face an inordinately large gain when they finally got off the rollover
bandwagon. However, a more fundamental solution to the problem would
have been to eliminate the rollover regime that caused the problem to begin
with. The original rationale for its enactment was shaky at best. Moreover,
even if one agreed that a home sale was analogous to a ship seized in times
of war, the problems created by multiple rollovers over many years were
unforeseen and should have prompted a re-examination of I.R.C. § 1034.
The possibility of repealing the rollover provisions, however, was
never even entertained as a possibility. This is a striking instantiation of the
path dependence problem: once Congress enacted the rollover provision,
homeowners began to accumulate deferred gains. To reverse course had
become too costly at that point in time, even if the rollover provision had
proved to be a mistake.
Path dependence also posits that once a path is chosen, each step down
the path entrenches the path more deeply and makes it more difficult to
reverse course. 7 9 With the enactment of the one-time exclusion, Congress
took another step down the path, making it even more costly to reverse
course. People expected not only to be able to defer the taxes on their gains
from homes sales; they now expected never to have to pay them.
Congress took another giant step down the path in 1997. With most
gains on most home sales now exempt from tax through the rollover
provision, in combination with the one-time exclusion, the next logical
step, it seemed, was to exempt home sales from tax entirely. As lawmakers
reasoned at the time, the gain exclusion would eliminate the incentive,
created under I.R.C. § 1034, for taxpayers to purchase increasingly
expensive homes. It would also eliminate the need for burdensome basis
recordkeeping that could stretch back for decades over multiple home sales.
The very same goals could have been achieved by eliminating both the
rollover provision and the one-time exclusion, and taxing gains on home
sales, but to propose this would surely would have been political suicide.
As path dependence predicts, reversing course was simply not an option.
that the deferral provides into a permanent forgiveness of tax liabilities. It thus compounds the
favorable tax treatment created by the deferral of capital gains on home sales.").
78. The costs of reversing course include the political fallout: voters would have been extremely
unhappy to have their home appreciation suddenly subject to tax. There would also be economic costs,
in terms of disruption to the housing market.
79. See PIERSON, supra note 63, at 35 ("[S]ocial actors make commitments based on existing
institutions and policies. As they do so, the cost of reversing course generally rises dramatically.").
204 [Vol. 65:1:187
2013] Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales 205
Bounded rationality limited the choice to the rollover regime or the
gain exclusion, and as between the two, policymakers also agreed that the
latter was preferable.8 0 Economist Martin Sullivan opined:
[T]his is probably one of the most sensible of the Clinton
proposals. It allows senior citizens to sell their homes before they
die without dire tax consequences. It also allows people who may
need to move into a less costly home - because of divorce, a
move to a lower-cost region, or the loss of a job - to not feel
obligated to buy more house than they need just to avoid paying
capital gains tax. It also eliminates the need for a lot of long-term
recordkeeping.
A 1996 study by economists Leonard Burman, Sally Wallace, and
David Weiner illustrates the limited universe of policy options that were
considered.82 The study makes a thorough and critical assessment of the
rollover regime and finds that it distorts homeowners' behavior, is costly to
administer, and exempts most gains from home sales from tax. Burman,
Wallace, and Weiner conclude that "[t]he tax on capital gains on homes
sales is an inefficient tax. It is easy to avoid. It raises little revenue, but it
affects the housing choices of tens of thousands of homeowners every
year." 84 The only alternative they consider is the repeal of the tax on gains
80. See Leonard E. Burman, Sally Wallace & David Weiner, How Capital Gains Taxes Distort
Homeowners' Decisions, in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE 89TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 382 (1997); John Y. Taggart, Eliminating Tax on Gain from Personal
Residences, 62 TAX NOTES 770 (1994) (arguing that an expanded exclusion for gains on home sales
would reduce unfair results to unwary taxpayers; reduce overinvestment in residential housing; and
reduce complexity); Peter Passell, The Easy One in Tax Breaks: Who 's Against Homeowners?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/31/business/the-easy-one-in-tax-breaks-who-
s-against-homeowners.html (reporting that economists Alan Auerbach, Harvey Rosen, and Joel
Slemrod believed the new law to be an improvement).
81. Martin A. Sullivan, Tax Analysts Budget Briefing on Clinton Tax Proposals, 74 TAX NOTES
678, 683 (1997).
82. See Burman, Wallace & Weiner, supra note 80.
83. Using data from the 1993 IRS Statistics of Income File, Burman, Wallace, and Weiner
identify slightly more than 1.5 million reported home sales (out of a total of 3.8 million existing home
sales, according to an estimate of the National Association of Realtors). Of the reported home sales, a
total of $50.5 billion in gains were reported, and almost all of the reported gain, $48 billion, was
excluded under either the rollover provision of I.R.C. § 1034 ($30 billion) or the one-time exclusion of
I.R.C. § 121 ($18 billion). See id. at 385. Burman, Wallace, and Weiner also estimate the costs of these
provisions-in terms of compliance costs and the distortive effects on homeowners' decisions about
home purchases and sales-and find that these costs were "probably equal to at least two-thirds of the
revenue collected, and possibly much more than 100 percent." See id. at 388. They estimate the
deadweight losses that results from people's decisions not to rent, or not to buy less expensive houses,
and the deadweight loss of compliance and recordkeeping associated with the rollover/one-time
exclusion regime. See id. at 387-89.
84. Id. at 388.
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from home sales-i.e., a gain exclusion.85 They do not consider a return to
the pre-rollover law, under which gains on home sales were taxed fully
even though, judged by their own evaluative criteria, this alternative would
have improved the tax greatly: it would have raised much more revenue,
been much more difficult to avoid, and have reduced compliance costs.
Path dependence and bounded rationality can help explain why
lawmakers and policymakers began with the assumption that gains on
home sales would continue to be tax-favored. With this assumption in
place, they chose what they believed to be a superior regime of
nontaxation. This is not to say, however, that lawmakers and policymakers
were unaware that they were making judgments in a constrained universe
of choices. Certainly, if asked why they had not also considered a return to
full taxation of gains on home sales, many would have cited the political
impossibility of such a proposal. As commentator Lee Sheppard observed:
"The best solution-the enemy of the good-is to go cold turkey on tax
incentives and let the decision to buy a house be a purely personal decision.
But this, as we have seen, is politically impossible."86
The next Part highlights the central role that politics played in the 1997
enactment of the gain exclusion, and provides further insights into how and
why it became the alternative to the rollover regime.
B. Politics
The idea of an expanded gain exclusion for home sales was first put
forth by Pennsylvania Congressman Richard T. Schulze in 1989, and then
again in 1990, 1991, and 1992. Schulze's proposal would have eliminated
the age and dollar amount limitations but retained the one-time use
limitation. The two largest Schulze campaign contributors during his time
85. Id. at 383, 389. They assess the relative merits of a complete repeal of the tax on gains from
home sales, as compared to the rollover/one-time exclusion regime. They note that neither the Clinton
proposal nor the Dole proposal would eliminate entirely the tax on gains from sales. Id. at 383. They
note that repeal of the tax would eliminate behavioral distortions, but they express concern about adding
yet another additional subsidy to homeownership. To address this concern, they also propose reducing
other homeownership subsidies. Id. at 389.
86. Sheppard, supra note 35, at 1434 (commenting on Representative Richard Schulze's 1991
proposal to expand I.R.C. § 121).
87. H.R. 1287, 101stCong. (1989); H.R. 1287, 101stCong. (1990); H.R. 1287, 102dCong.
(1991); H.R. 1287, 102d Cong. (1992). Schulze apparently never met a tax preference he didn't like: He
also proposed a toddler tax credit (H.R. 4434, 100th Cong. (1988)), an interest deduction for education
loans (H.R. 747, 101st Cong. (1989)), a restoration of the capital gains preference in 1988 (H.R. 4010,
100th Cong. (1988)), an investment tax credit in 1987 (H.R. 246, 100th Cong. (1987)), as well as
preferences regarding individual retirement accounts (H.R. 5571, 97th Cong. (1982)), one regarding
religious objections to participation in Social Security (H.R. 2259, 100th Cong. (1988)), a bill regarding
computation of taxable interest in residential construction (H.R. 5151, 100th Cong. (1988)), and a bill
designed to provide a fixed rate on reversionary property remaining in an estate (H.R. 5484,
100th Cong. (1988)).
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in Congress were the National Association of Home Builders and the
National Association of Realtors."
Schulze argued that a widely available exclusion for home sales would
help garner broad support for reinstating a capital gains preference because
it would counteract the perception that the capital gains preference
benefitted only wealthy taxpayers.89 In addition, Schulze claimed that
because of the incentive created under I.R.C. § 1034 to trade up to more
expensive homes, "homeowners practically have to build mansions ... to
avoid being hit with a stiff tax on the gain of the sale to their home." 90 He
further argued that an expanded exclusion would eliminate basis
recordkeeping; provide relief for homeowners forced to sell due to divorce,
illness, or age; make housing more affordable by reducing housing price
distortions; allow homeowners more quickly to move up from starter
homes to larger homes; and eliminate the tax on gains attributable to
inflation.9 1
Although Schulze's proposal was not enacted, his idea-and the
rationales for it-gained traction in Washington. In the early years of the
Clinton Administration, members of Clinton's tax policy team had
proposed to exempt most gains from home sales as a simplification
measure that would eliminate the need for homeowners to keep track of
their basis in their homes.9 2 Later, in December 1995, Clinton had offered
up the proposal to Republican congressional leaders to appease their
demands for broad tax cuts. 9 3
Then, in 1996, as Clinton fought to keep the White House for a second
term, Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole proposed to exempt most
gains from home sales as part of a massive tax cut plan.9 4 The Dole
proposal was more generous than the Schulze proposal: it did away with
88. See Richard T. Schulze, INFLUENCE EXPLORER, http://influenceexplorer.com/politician/
richard-t-schulze-r/cb3137b5894740709a32e548ce02cO92 (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).
89. See Letter from Dick Schulze, Member of Congress, to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman,
Comm. on Ways & Means (June 19, 1989), in Schulze asks Rosty and Brady for Capital Gains Relief
on Residences and Depreciable Property, 89 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-2 (1989).
90. Id.
91. See id.; see also Sheppard, supra note 35, at 1433 (providing further details about Schulze's
justifications for an expanded I.R.C. § 121).
92. See Vikas Bajaj & David Leonhardt, Tax Break May Have Helped Cause Housing Bubble,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/business/l9tax.html?
pagewanted=all& r-0 (reporting that Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy,
and Eric J. Toder, Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Analysis, both from 1993 to 1996, were
interested in exempting gains from home sales as a simplification measure).
93. See Jerry Gray, Clinton Proposes Tax Cuts on Profits in Home Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/30/us/clinton-proposes-tax-cuts-on-profits-in-homesales.html.
94. Along with his proposal to expand the exclusion of gain for home sales, Dole proposed to cut
income tax rates by 15% across the board, cut capital gains rates in half, enact a $500 child credit,
expand Individual Retirement Accounts, and reform the IRS, while at the same time he pledged to
achieve a balanced budget within five years. See Seelye, supra note 46.
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the one-time use limitation on the exclusion; increased the exclusion
amount to $250,000 for married taxpayers who owned and used their
homes for at least three of five years preceding the sale, and for taxpayers
who had owned their homes between ten and twenty years; and
incrementally increased the exclusion amount to a maximum of $250,000
for single taxpayers and $500,000 for married taxpayers.9 5
Clinton had to come up with a plan to compete with Dole's. His
political strategists advised him to propose a major cut in capital gains, but
Clinton's economic advisers, concerned with the budgetary consequences,
opposed the idea.96 Instead, they seized upon the expanded gain exclusion
for home sales as a way to appeal to a broad swath of voters.9 7 At the same
time, because very few home sellers paid tax under the rollover regime, the
revenue loss from an expanded exclusion was estimated to be quite small.
As one journalist summarized,
[B]roadening the capital gains exemption [for home sales is] a
deficit-conscious Presidential candidate's dream. Here, after all, is
a tax break with great popular appeal that requires only modest
offsetting revenues. And here, miracle of miracles, is a tax break
that even passes muster with policy wonks-and for many of the
same reasons that it would please homeowners. 99
Not to be outdone by Dole, Clinton put forth a proposal that was even
more generous in certain respects: it eliminated the one-time use restriction
(like Dole's) and provided an exclusion of $250,000 ($500,000 for married
taxpayers) to homeowners who owned their homes for a mere two of five
years preceding the sale. Clinton unveiled his proposal at the Democratic
National Convention'00 and cited it during the presidential debates when
asked whether he intended to cut capital gains taxes. 101 Clinton won the
election, and in 1997, he signed into law the provisions that essentially
codified his proposal.10 2
95. See Kenneth R. Harney, Candidates Vow to Cut Home Sales Tax, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-08/realestate/re-41663_Igains-tax.
96. See Bajaj & Leonhardt, supra note 92.
97. See id.; Passell, supra note 80.
98. The gain exclusion was estimated to cost $1.6 billion over six years. In contrast, Dole's tax
plan was estimated to cost $542 billion. See Gray, supra note 93.
99. See Passell, supra note 80.
100. President Bill Clinton, Address by the President to the Democratic National Convention
(Aug. 29, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.4president.org/speeches/clintongorel996convention.
htm).
101. President Bill Clinton, Presidential Debate in San Diego (Oct. 16, 1996) (transcript available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=52115).
102. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the political story shows how the gain exclusion became
the favored choice of lawmakers. The idea began as the hobby horse of a
congressman generously funded by the real estate lobby. It gained traction
as a simplification measure in the early years of the Clinton administration,
and then did duty as a capital gains sop Clinton offered to the Republicans
during the 1995 budget negotiations. Finally, it gathered momentum during
the 1996 presidential campaign, both as a component of Dole's ambitious
tax-cutting agenda, and, perhaps more crucially, as a vehicle for Clinton to
demonstrate his support for capital gains tax cuts while at the same time
preserving his credentials as a deficit hawk. The specific features of the
new law-for example, the two-of-five use-and-ownership requirement-
were more the product of an "anything you can do, I can do better" contest
between Clinton and Dole, than thoughtful policy design.
Given this political backstory, it becomes clear why lawmakers ignored
the possibility of moving toward a more comprehensive tax on gains from
home sales. Although this alternative would have ameliorated many of the
undesirable features of the rollover regime, with the Gingrich-led
Republicans agitating for tax cuts, no politician in his right mind would
have made such a proposal.
Economists and other commentators did not face the same political
costs of reversing course that lawmakers did. Yet, virtually all of them
approved of the new law and the rationales for it and did not consider other
options. 0 3 In their defense, the mainstream media expected commentators
to react to the proposals on the table and compare them to the status quo at
the time, and they probably would not have been interested in hearing
about alternatives, such as taxing gains on home sales, that were political
nonstarters. Furthermore, policymakers often have to be pragmatic and
support the "less bad" alternative. Nonetheless, the approval of
commentators helped clear the way for the gain exclusion to become the
law.
C. The Role of the Real Estate Lobby
The real estate lobby was another important actor in nudging
lawmakers down the path to the gain exclusion. The presence of the real
estate lobby in U.S. housing policy has been pervasive since the New
103. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. Some commentators did point out Clinton's
political sleight of hand in claiming that an expanded exclusion would both cut capital gains tax but
result in almost no revenue loss. See Sullivan, supra note 81, at 683 ("Given the already generous
benefits available for capital gains on sales of personal residences, this proposal is not as big a deal as
the administration would like taxpayers to believe."); Passell, supra note 80 ("'Hardly anybody pays the
capital gains tax on housing, so eliminating it wouldn't make much difference . . . .' (quoting Princeton
economist Harvey Rosen)).
209
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:1:187
Deal.10 4 Trade associations such as the National Association of Realtors
and the National Association of Homebuilders influence myriad aspects of
housing policy-from mortgage finance' 05 to public housing 06 to tax
subsidies.' 07
It is predictable, then, that the real estate lobby was involved at
practically every stage in the development of tax subsidies for home
sales. 08 As is evident from the many references to lobbyists throughout this
Article, the real estate lobby was extremely active around the time of the
1997 law. They were the largest campaign contributors of Congressman
Schulze, the first and frequent champion of an expanded exclusion;' 09 they
provided media sound bites about the new law as the "ultimate 'get the
I.R.S. out of your life' provision"; 1l0 and they promoted the "too good to be
true" tax benefits of flipping under the 1997 law."'
The testimony of real estate lobbyists in the congressional hearing
related to the 1997 law (the "1997 Hearing") provides more direct evidence
104. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 93-114 (1997); William Lilley III, The Homebuilders' Lobby,
in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 32 (John Pynoos, Robert Schafer & Chester W. Hartman eds., 2d ed.
1980).
105. See Ben Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 3, 2010); see also Deniz
Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis, 26
NBER MACROECON. ANN. 195 (2011); Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, The Political
Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis, 100 AM. ECON. REv. 1967 (2010); Simon Johnson, The
Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2009/05/the-quiet-coup/307364/?single_page=true; Glenn R. Simpson, Lender Lobbying Blitz Abetted
Mortgage Mess, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2007, at Al; Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Franceso Trebbi, The
Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16107, 2010).
106. See Alexander von Hoffman, A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the
Housing Act of 1949, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 299 (2000); see also Alexander von Hoffman, The
End of the Dream: The Political Struggle ofAmerica's Public Housers, 4 J. PLAN. HIST. 222 (2005);
Alexander von Hoffman, Calling Upon the Genius: Housing Policy in the Great Society, Part Three,
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Working Paper W10-6, 2010).
107. See HOWARD, supra note 104, at 93-114 (describing the role of lobbyists in housing policy
during the 1930s and forward, in the context of the mortgage interest deduction); Ventry, supra note 5,
at 233 (same); Jody Shenn & Noah Buhayar, Housing Lobby's Win Costing U.S. $600 Billion:
Mortgages, BLOOMBERG (Jan 3, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-
03/housing-lobby-s-win-costing-u-s-600-billion-mortgages.html; Top 10 Tax Stories of the Decade,
TAX FOUNDATION (Dec. 30, 2009), http://taxfoundation.org/article/top-10-tax-stories-decade##4
(listing as the number four story the "Influence of the Housing Lobby on the Federal Tax Code").
108. See Revenue Act of 1978, Part 5: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 95th Cong. 1055-57
(1978) (statement of Wallace R. Woodbury, Realtor, Salt Lake City, Utah and Chairman, Federal
Taxation Subcommittee, National Association of Realtors); Tax Reform Act of 1975, Part 2: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 516-22 (1976) (statement of Don Lawrence, President,
National Apartment Association); AntiRecession Tax Cut: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 94th
Cong. 442-44 (1975) (statement of William McKenna, General Counsel and Vice-President, National
Savings and Loan League).
109. See Schulze, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
110. See Ravo, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Ill. See Adams, infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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of real estate lobby influence. The statement of Richard Woodbury on
behalf of the National Association of Realtors corresponds closely with the
analysis and language of the 1997 House Report.1 12
Woodbury's statement (1) details the difficulties faced by taxpayers in
keeping track of basis "[o]ver the course of a lifetime" under the rollover
regime; (2) discusses the incentive under the rollover regime to "buy ever
more expensive housing, even though they might not need it," noting
especially that "homeowners who relocate from high housing cost areas are
perceived as driving up the cost of housing when they relocate to lower
cost areas"; and (3) criticizes the one-time exclusion for being allowable
only once, and for not being available where a widow or widower who has
already used the exclusion remarries someone who has not." 3
In comparison, the 1997 House Report (1) details the difficulties of
keeping track of basis "for many decades" under the rollover regime; (2)
discusses how the rollover regime encourages taxpayers "to purchase larger
and more expensive houses than they otherwise would in order to avoid a
tax liability, particularly those who move from areas where housing costs
are high to lower-cost areas"; and (3) discusses how the one-time exclusion
discourages elderly people from moving, and also presents "traps for the
unwary" in the case of widowed and divorced taxpayers."14
This remarkable similarity between Woodbury's statement and the
1997 House Report does not mean that the real estate lobby dictated the
terms of the 1997 law. It is possible that both documents simply reflect
objective and widely held views about the problems with the rollover
regime. However, the real estate lobby's top priority was to promote its
own interests; to think otherwise would be naYve. The parallels between the
documents, along with the fact that not a single individual or organization
offered testimony in opposition to the views of the real estate lobby,
suggest that it exerted considerable influence. The real estate lobby not
only helped push through the substantive law change but also provided the
reasoning and specific language that became the official explanation for
why Congress changed the law."'
The testimony of the real estate lobbyists during the 1997 Hearing also
offers hints about other aspects of the law that they may have influenced.
The 1997 House Report gives no explanation for the generous increase in
112. See Savings and Investment Provisions in the Administration's Fiscal Year 1998 Budget
Proposal: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 105th Cong. 70 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
Hearing] (statement of Richard Woodbury, President, Woodbury Corp, on behalf of the National
Association of Realtors).
113. See id. The statement of C. Kent Conine on behalf of the National Association of
Homebuilders also cites basis recordkeeping as a problem with the rollover regime. See id. at 214.
114. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 347-48 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 741-42.
115. See id.; 1997 Hearing, supra note 112, at 70.
211
Alabama Law Review
the amount of the exclusion, from $125,000 to as much as $500,000 (for
married taxpayers). Woodbury points out that less than two percent of
home sales exceeded $500,000 at the time, which meant that almost all
home sales would be exempt from tax.' 16 He characterizes this as a
simplification measure because almost all homeowners would be relieved
of recordkeeping burdens." 7 In the absence of any explanation for how the
new exclusion amount was determined, one can speculate that the National
Association of Realtors, which compiles authoritative data about home
sales, was eager to suggest $500,000 as the new exclusion amount.
Another hint of the real estate lobby's influence relates to the broker
reporting exemption for home sales, which, as is discussed below, severely
impairs the ability of the IRS to enforce the new law." 8 The 1997 House
Report offers little insight as to the reasons for the reporting exemption.119
However, there is some indication that the real estate lobby advocated for
it. In his statement for the 1997 Hearing, C. Kent Conine, on behalf of the
National Association of Homebuilders, discusses at length the fact that
most taxpayers who sold their homes under the rollover regime were not
required to pay any tax, and that "only half of all home sellers even file the
proper form." 2 0 Woodbury reiterates the National Association of Realtors'
talking point that the new law "is the ultimate 'Get the IRS out of your life'
proposal."l21 Again, one can speculate that the real estate lobby would have
known about the broker reporting requirement and would also have been
acutely aware of the importance of eliminating it.
This Part has explored how path dependence and bounded rationality,
in a complex interaction with politics and the influence of interest groups,
have brought the tax law to a place where almost all gains on home sales
are exempt from tax. Building on this more nuanced and complete
understanding of how the law developed, the next Part reassesses the law.
III. WHERE WE ARE: AN ASSESSMENT
This Part revisits the reasons for repealing the rollover regime and
replacing it with the gain exclusion. It finds that many of the purported
advantages of the gain exclusion relative to the rollover regime are
116. See 1997 Hearing, supra note 112, at 71.
117. See id.
118. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 421, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 822 ("The
Committee believes that informational returns should not generally be required on sales of personal
residences where the sales price does not exceed the amount eligible to be excluded from income.").
120. See 1997 Hearing, supra note 112, at 214.
121. See id. at 71.
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questionable. Moreover, the gain exclusion has created new problems that
were not foreseen at the time it was enacted.
A. Basis Recordkeeping
The burden of keeping track of basis over long time periods was cited
by virtually all lawmakers, policymakers, and commentators as a major
problem under the rollover regime.122 As described above, the rollover
regime deferred tax on the gain from a home sale by transferring a
taxpayer's basis in his old residence to his new residence, thereby
preserving the amount of gain that went unrecognized on the old residence.
This process of transferring basis could continue through a succession of
home sales qualifying for rollover.123 The purported problem of basis
recordkeeping was an important component of the "baby with the
bathwater" argument-that taxing home sales was so burdensome and
difficult, and collected so little tax, it would be better to jettison the tax
entirely, and simply exempt all home sales from tax.
To be sure, basis recordkeeping can be costly and challenging.124
Joseph Dodge and Jay Soled have documented substantial and widespread
compliance issues related to basis generally, not just basis in houses.12 5
Amidst the rampant noncompliance uncovered in a 1979 study-which
Dodge and Soled judge to be the most accurate available-personal
residence sales stood out as one of the worst categories.12 6
But are the problems of basis recordkeeping as insurmountable as was
readily assumed in the assessment of the rollover regime? The law relating
to basis for inherited property is instructive on this question. Dodge and
Soled cite the ill-fated 1976 law relating to basis in inherited property as
122. See supra notes 33, 80-81 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. In addition, the taxpayer might also have
adjustments to basis over the years by reason of home improvements made to one or more of the series
of homes. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
124. Burman, Wallace, and Weiner quantify the compliance cost of taxing home sales under the
rollover regime by estimating how many hours taxpayers spend filling out the forms required at that
time. See Burman, Wallace & Weiner, supra note 80, at 388. A broader measure of compliance costs
would also attempt to quantify the efforts of the IRS-through audits, litigation and other means-to
ensure that taxpayers complied with the law.
125. See Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth Under the Income Tax, 81
IND. L.J. 539 (2006) (describing rampant underreporting of gain and proposing reforms to enhance
accurate basis reporting).
126. See id. at 580. Dodge and Soled assert that the noncompliance problem for home sales was
largely eliminated by the 1997 expansion of I.R.C. § 121. See id. at 580, n.216 ("The personal residence
gain reporting issue has been largely (if not completely) swept under the rug by the expansion of 1.R.C.
§ 121 (excluding up to $250,000 of gains per taxpayer per qualified principal residence sale)."). This is
not entirely true; basis recordkeeping is still necessary for many homeowners.
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the sole instance in which basis noncompliance received explicit
attention.127
The 1976 law provided for a carryover basis for inherited property,
which had the effect of preserving gains that went unrealized upon property
transfers at death.12 8 (Prior law had provided for a fair market value basis
upon such transfers, which had the effect of exempting such gains from
tax. 129) Practitioners, estate administrators, and lobbyists waged a relentless
war against the law, complaining that keeping track of carryover basis over
many years would be impossibly complex and difficult. In 1980, Congress
repealed the law retroactive to its effective date.130
Twenty years later, the same tactic would again be deployed
successfully to enact the gain exclusion for home sales. Because keeping
tabs on deferred gains through historic basis was too difficult, the argument
went, the solution should be to exempt gain from tax. However, as
Lawrence Zelenak puts it, "tax policy should not be held hostage to
taxpayers' refusal to comply with reasonable record-keeping rules."' 3'
Dodge and Soled argue that basis recordkeeping is not an impossible
task, and they propose many compliance and enforcement mechanisms to
increase the accuracy of basis reporting.' 3 2 Similarly, in the inherited
property context, Zelenak makes a careful assessment of the claims about
the difficulties of basis recordkeeping and is quite skeptical about their
validity.13 3 Zelenak places particular weight on the experience of Canada.
In 1971, Canada enacted a capital gains tax at death, which necessitates a
determination of historic basis at death.13 4 Zelenak finds that basis
determination is "simply not a major problem" in Canada.13 5 Zelenak
concludes that "it is difficult to take seriously the argument that problems
of basis determination make a death gains tax impractical." 36
The analyses of Dodge and Soled and Zelenak suggest that one of the
principal criticisms of the rollover regime was probably overstated and
likely underexamined. This is not to say that the rollover regime should
127. See id. at 541-42.
128. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872, repealed by
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229, 299.
129. See I.R.C. § 1014 (2006).
130. See Dodge & Soled, supra note 125, at 541-42; Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death,
46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 365, 388-92 (1993).
131. See Zelenak, supra note 130, at 391.
132. See Dodge & Soled, supra note 125, at 583-97 (proposing to expand third party reporting,
heighten the duty of taxpayers to keep track of basis, and simplify the computation of basis).
133. See Zelenak, supra note 130, at 388-92.
134. See id. at 382.
135. See id. at 391.
136. Id. at 392. But see David J. Herzig, Something from Nothing: Taxing Assets Accurately,
2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1063-72 (describing the difficulties encountered by taxpayers in keeping
track of basis).
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have been retained. However, it does suggest that the relative merits of the
rollover regime and the gain exclusion should be reexamined, particularly
in respect of the argument that basis recordkeeping is so difficult and costly
that we should simply abandon all hope of taxing gains on home sales.
B. Incentive Effects
Another important and widely noted criticism of the rollover regime
had to do with its incentive effects.' 37 I.R.C. § 1034 encouraged people to
reinvest in ever-more expensive homes, resulting in overinvestment in
owner-occupied housing (the "buy up incentive") and penalizing those who
chose to "buy down," that is, move to cheaper homes. 38
Substantial evidence supports the claim that the buy up incentive of the
rollover regime did in fact have these effects on individuals' behavior.' 39
While it is difficult to quantify the social costs of the effects, the
assumption is that they were undesirable-the buy up incentive resulted in
137. The 1997 Report does not couch the shortcomings of the rollover regime in terms of
incentive effects and the systemic inefficiencies created by them. Rather, the 1997 Report seems more
concerned with the unfair result to individual homeowners. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, the efficiency rationales for repealing the rollover regime and adopting the gain
exclusion were articulated by commentators at the time and since have become part of the accepted
wisdom for why the rollover regime was flawed.
138. A related incentive, which was not explicitly considered at the time of the rollover regime
was repealed, has to do with labor mobility. The effects on labor mobility of the rollover regime and the
gain exclusion have received more attention in recent years, and are discussed below. See infra notes
212-214 and accompanying text.
139. See Gerald Auten & Jane G. Gravelle, The Exclusion of Capital Gains on the Sale of
Principal Residences: Policy Options, in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 102ND
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION, 103, 103-04 (2009), available at http://www.ntanet.org/images/
stories/pdf/proceedings/09/012.pdf; see also JANE G. GRAVELLE & PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL32978, THE EXCLUSION OF CAPITAL GAINS FOR OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 3, 6
(2007); Burman, Wallace & Weiner, supra note 80, at 387 (estimating that in 1993, about eight percent
of home sellers would have chosen to "buy down" rather than "buy up" had their gains been exempt
from tax instead of subject to the rollover regime); William H. Hoyt & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Capital
Gains Taxation and the Demand for Owner-Occupied Housing, 72 REv. ECON. & STAT. 45, 45, 52
(1990) (finding that the rollover regime may cause some families to buy up when they might otherwise
prefer to buy down and may create a deadweight loss because of price distortions); William H. Hoyt &
Stuart S. Rosenthal, Owner-Occupied Housing, Capital Gains, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 32 J.
URB. ECON. 119, 136-37 (1992) (finding that the 1986 increase in capital gains rates increased the
incentive to buy up, and that reducing capital gains rates caused some homeowners to buy down);
Gerald Auten & Andrew Reschovsky, The New Exclusion for Capital Gains on Principal Residences,
7-11 (U.S. Treas. Dep't Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 7X, 1998) (on file with author);
Todd Sinai, Taxation, User Cost, and Household Mobility Decisions, (Wharton Sch., Univ. of Penn.,
Working Paper No. 303) (finding a reduction in tax rates on gains sales affects individuals' decisions
whether to buy up but has little effect on their decision whether to move).
There is also evidence that the one-time exclusion promoted mobility among homeowners of age 55-
64, although surprisingly, many of these homeowners did not "downsize" as had been contemplated
when the one-time exclusion was enacted. See Sandra Newman & James Reschovsky, An Evaluation of
the One-Time Capital Gains Exclusion for Older Homeowners, 15 REAL EST. ECON. 704, 706-17
(1987); Sandra Newman & James Reschovsky, Federal Policy and the Mobility of Older Homeowners,
6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 402, 406-)7 (1987).
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an overinvestment in owner-occupied housing relative to other capital
assets or drove up prices for such housing. 14 0
The 1997 repeal of the rollover regime and adoption of the gain
exclusion were intended to remove these undesirable effects. There is
evidence that the 1997 law did alter homeowners' behavior as expected:
more homeowners sold their houses in the years immediately following the
new law, 141 and more of them bought down.142
At the same time, however, the gain exclusion introduced new
incentives and created new distortions. It allowed a taxpayer to exclude up
to $250,000 (if single) or $500,000 (if married) of gain on a home sale, and
in contrast to the rollover provision, the taxpayer did not have to reinvest
the sale proceeds in another home to achieve this result.14 3 But where better
to reinvest the sale proceeds than in another house that would yield another
tax free gain two years later? The website of the National Association of
Realtors features this snappy description of the strategy:
140. Burman, Wallace, and Weiner quantify the behavioral distortions caused by the rollover
regime by estimating the deadweight losses that result from people's decisions not to rent or not to buy
less expensive houses, and the deadweight loss of compliance and recordkeeping associated with the
rollover/one-time exclusion regime. See Burman, Wallace & Weiner, supra note 80, at 387-89. In
addition to these costs, there may be other social costs related to the buy up incentive, such as increased
friction on labor mobility. See infra notes 214-221 and accompanying text. Moreover, scholars have
theorized that the overinvestment in housing caused by tax subsidies for homeownership contributes to
suburban sprawl, environmental degradation, and other social ills. See Mona L. Hymel, The Population
Crisis: The Stork, The Plow, and the IRS, 77 N.C. L. REv. 13, 112-16 (1998) (arguing that tax subsidies
for homeownership promote suburban sprawl, overconsumption of housing, and overreliance on auto
transportation); Klein, supra note 5, at 406-07 (arguing that I.R.C. § 1034 unintentionally promoted
overinvestment in housing and conversion of farmland into suburban housing); Mann, supra note 5
(arguing that the home mortgage interest deduction encourages suburban sprawl).
141. See Christopher R. Cunningham & Gary V. Engelhardt, Housing Capital-Gains Taxation
and Homeowner Mobility: Evidence form the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 63 J. URB. EcoN. 803 (2008)
(finding that the elimination of the 55-or-older requirement for I.R.C. § 121 caused an increase in home
sales by homeowners aged 52-54); Amelia M. Biehl & William H. Hoyt, The Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 and Homeownership: Is Smaller Now Better? 9-10, 21 (Inst. for Federalism & Intergov't
Relations, Working Papdr No. 2009-014, 2008), available at http://www.ifigr.org/publication/
ifir workingjpapers/IFIR-WP-2009-04.pdf (finding that the elimination of the 55-or-older requirement
for I.R.C. § 121 caused an increase in home sales by homeowners aged 45-54).
It is not clear that the increased frequency of home sales has persisted. Cunningham and Engelhardt
speculate that prior to the 1997 Act, homeowners just under the age of 55 might have delayed their
home sales, awaiting the new law, which would result in a short-lived increase in home sales
immediately after enactment of the new law. See Cunningham & Engelhardt, supra, at 814. Biehl and
Hoyt's findings appear to bear this out: they found that the new law increased home sales in the years
1998-1999, but found no evidence that the new law increased home sales in the years 2002-2004. See
Biehl & Hoyt, supra, at 17, 19.
142. See Biehl & Hoyt, supra note 141, at 17, 19 (finding that the 1997 law resulted in downward
mobility during both periods they studied, 1998-1999, and 2002-2004, suggesting a lasting effect).
Cunningham and Engelhardt were unable to observe whether people sold their homes in order to trade
down because the census data they relied upon does not provide that information. Cunningham &
Engelhardt, supra note 141, at 815.
143. See Biehl & Hoyt, supra note 141, at 1.
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This is the best. In fact, I can hardly believe this myself. Here's
how it works:
If you have owned and occupied your principal residence for at
least two of the past five years, you can earn up to $500,000 on the
sale of that house and pay no federal income tax whatsoever.
That's assuming you are married-singles get up to $250,000 tax
free. And here comes the kicker:
You can do this as often as every two years for the rest of your
life.
This is as good an excuse for getting married as I have ever
heard. Buy a fixer-upper in an up and coming neighborhood, work
on it nights and weekends for two years, then sell it at a nice profit
and pocket the cash, totally free of federal taxes. And most states
recognize the federal exclusion, so you put the cash away totally
tax free. You don't have to re-invest, you don't have to be age 55,
and you can do this every two years forever. No, I'm not kidding.
Many of these benefits came into being with the 1997 tax law,
but lots of folks are just finding out about them now, so buy and
sell to your heart's content. Just don't plan on staying forever!l4 4
So, while some homeowners were freed from the buy up constraint of
the rollover regime and used the gain exclusion to buy down to a more
modest house-perhaps freeing up capital to invest elsewhere or
facilitating a work relocation to a lower cost region of the country-other
homeowners became serial "flippers."
This new incentive effect-the "flipping" incentive-was largely
unremarked-upon at the time the gain exclusion was enacted. Lawmakers
were much more focused on extolling the economic and social benefits of
the gain exclusion.145 Some experts opined that the gain exclusion would
have practically no effect because most gains on home sales were already
exempt from tax. 14 6 Others speculated that the gain exclusion might cause
144. John Adams, Tax Benefits of Home Ownership Are Almost Too Good to Be True,
REALTOR.COM, http://www.realtor.com/basics/buy/closepossess/taxbenefits.asp (last visited Aug. 21,
2013). Given that realtors receive commissions on home purchases and sales, it is not surprising that
realtors would characterize this exclusion as "the best" of all tax benefits-better than even the home
mortgage interest deduction or the real property tax deduction-and would highlight the ability to use
the exclusion repeatedly. See Kay Bell, Capital Gains Home-Sale Tax Break a Boon for Owners,
BANKRATE.COM (Oct. 18, 2004), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/capital-gains-home-sale-
tax-break-a-boon-for-owners-4.aspx.
145. As one senator proclaimed: "By letting hard-working Americans keep more of their own
money, we allow them to preserve their family, prepare for their own future, and invest in the nation's
economy." 143 CONG. REc. S8405 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Smith).
146. See Sullivan, supra note 81, at 683 ("Given the already generous benefits available for
capital gains on sales of personal residences, this proposal is not as big a deal as the administration
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homeowners to buy down and shift their investments to other sectors, also
helping bring down housing prices.14 7 One economist, Eugene Steuerle,
identified the flipping incentive and speculated that it might cause owners
of expensive homes to sell them more frequently than they had in the
past.148
There were anecdotal reports that the gain exclusion may have
contributed to the record number of home sales in the year after it was
enacted.14 9 However, it was several years before comprehensive evidence
began to emerge.15 0 During that time, we experienced an unprecedented
boom and bust in the real estate market, which precipitated the global
financial crisis. As a result, the question whether the gain exclusion
contributed to excessive levels of homeownership and inflated prices has
taken on an added urgency.
Research on this question is underway, but it is not yet clear whether
and to what extent the gain exclusion helped create the real estate bubble.
In 2008, New York Times economic reporters Vikas Bajaj and David
Leonhardt, suggested that it did:
[M]any economists say that the law had a noticeable impact,
allowing home sales to become tax-free windfalls. A recent study
of the provision by an economist at the Federal Reserve suggests
that the number of homes sold was almost 17 percent higher over
the last decade than it would have been without the law.
By favoring real estate, the tax code pushed many Americans to
begin thinking of their houses more as an investment than as a
place to live. It helped change the national conversation about
would like taxpayers to believe."); Passell, supra note 80 ("Hardly anybody pays the capital gains tax
on housing, so eliminating it wouldn't make much difference. . . ." (quoting Princeton economist
Harvey Rosen)).
147. See Passell, supra note 80 (reporting on economist Alan Auerbach's views).
148. See Eugene Steuerle, The Newly Mobile-and Immobile-Rich, 76 TAX NOTES 1481, 1481-
82 (1997). Steuerle notes that the flipping incentive is offset by transactions costs, the benefits of
deferral, and, in the case of very expensive houses, the possibility of incurring some tax on sale. See id.;
see also Michael H. Morris, The Relevance of the Principal Residence Gain Exclusion, 121 TAX NOTES
684 (2008) (analyzing effects of I.R.C. § 121 as a function of house value, appreciation, and frequency
of sale).
149. Kenneth R. Harney, Tax Law Change Gives Boost to Home Sales, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1999, at KI (Orange County ed.), available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/24/realestate/re-l 123
("[New I.R.C. § 121] could have influenced anywhere from 100,000 to 500,000 of 1998's record 4.8
million resales.").
150. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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housing. Not only did real estate look like a can't-miss investment
for much of the last decade, it was also a tax-free one.' 5'
In response, Burman questioned Bajaj and Leonhardt's interpretation
of the study they cite and their claim that the gain exclusion contributed to
the housing bubble. He defended the gain exclusion as preferable to the
undesirable rollover regime it replaced and stated that "it certainly is not a
significant factor in the housing bubble."l52
In 2011, Hui Shan, whose then-unpublished study had been cited by
Bajaj and Leonhardt, finalized and published the study. In addition, one
other unpublished study emerged that specifically studied the effects of the
gain exclusion on the frequency of home sales. 53
In her study, Shan uses records of selling prices and dates of sales
provided by a private company to examine single-family, residential home
sales in sixteen cities and towns in the Boston metropolitan area from 1982
through 2008.154 The cities and towns were relatively homogeneous with
high house prices and no active market for second homes. 55  The
homeowners were mostly high-income and well-educated.156 Shan's data
does not include information about the actual gains realized on individual
home sales. Instead, she extrapolates median house prices for each year she
studies, and then, based on the change in median price during the time for
which a house was owned, she imputes a gain to a selling homeowner. 5 7
Shan finds that home sales rates increased by as much as 19% to 24% after
the 1997 law change for sales with gains between $0 and $500,000,
151. Bajaj & Leonhardt, supra note 92; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 419 (asserting,
without providing any evidence, that "[t]he current housing and financial sector meltdown is not the
result of a market failure, but is the natural, necessary, and presumably unintended result of the tax
preferences extended to residential real estate in 1997"). Bajaj and Leonhardt note that factors other
than the tax exclusion, such as lax lending standards, regulatory failure, falling interest rates, and
irrational expectations about housing prices probably played larger roles. See generally Bajaj &
Leonhardt, supra note 92.
152. Len Burman, Did the Capital Gains Tax Break on Home Sales Help Inflate the Housing
Bubble?, TAXVOx (December 22, 2008, 1:17 PM), http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2008/12/22/did-
the-capital-gains-tax-break-on-home-sales-help-inflate-the-housing-bubble/.
153. See Hui Shan, The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on Home Sales: Evidence from the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 95 J. PUB. EcON. 177 (2011); Andrea J. Heuson & Gary Painter, The
Impact of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 on Housing Turnover in the U.S. Single Family Residential
Market (June 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Two 2008 studies, by Cunningham
and Engelhardt, and Biehl and Hoyt, also found evidence of increased home sales after 1997, but both
were limited to homeowners nearing age 55. In addition, neither study addresses the question whether
the 1997 law contributed to the real estate bubble. See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
154. See Shan, supra note 153, at 179-80.
155. See id. at 180.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 181.
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although the impact was more pronounced immediately after the law
change and declined over time 158
In sum, Shan finds evidence that the gain exclusion contributed to an
increase in home sales, but she is also careful to provide caveats about this
finding. She notes that her sample is not representative of the population at
large.159 She also notes that her paper does not measure the effects of the
new law on investment in housing versus other investments, nor does it
observe where people moved once they sold their houses.16 0
Another recent study examines the effect of the 1997 law on home
sales nationwide. 16 1 Using American Housing Survey data to estimate the
quantity of housing stock and information from the National Association of
Realtors about the number of home sales, Andrea Heuson and Gary Painter
estimate housing turnover rates from 1980 to 2006.162 They find that
housing turnover increased significantly after 1997.163 Heuson and Painter
also use longitudinal information from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics1 6 4 to determine whether selling homeowners traded up or traded
down. 16 5 They found that both trading up and trading down increased
significantly among households of all ages after 1997.166
Heuson and Painter investigate specifically whether the increase in
trading up that they observe might be the result of the flipping incentive-
that is, whether homeowners traded up more frequently after 1997 to "reset
the basis that determines future excludable capital gains calculations" 67
They hypothesize that trading up will be more frequent in the highest
appreciation areas because homeowners will need to reset their basis more
frequently to avoid exceeding the exclusion amount.168 To test this, they
compare rates of trading up in high-appreciation states-Arizona,
California, Florida, and Nevada-to rates of trading up in general. 16 9 They
do not find evidence that trading up was more frequent in these states.170
158. See id. at 186, 188. This suggests that homeowners who had planned to sell their homes in
the time leading up to the 1997 law change may have delayed their sales, leading to a temporary
increase in home sales immediately after the new law took effect. This is consistent with the findings of
Biehl and Hoyt and Cunningham and Engelhardt. See supra note 141.
159. See id. at 188.
160. See id.
161. See Heuson & Painter, supra note 153.
162. See id. at 7-8.
163. See id. at 18.
164. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics is a long running longitudinal household survey
conducted by the Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.
165. See Heuson & Painter, supra note 153, at 12-14.
166. See id. at 18.
167. Id. at 13.
168. See id. at 14.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 15, 19.
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Thus, they conclude that there is no clear evidence that the flipping
incentive caused the increase in trading up after 1997.171
Despite the lack of evidence that the flipping incentive caused an
increase in trading up, Heuson and Painter nonetheless speculate that the
1997 law "might have played a small role in the formation of the house
price bubble."l 72 They speculate that the relatively small impact of the tax
law change may have generated large impacts through a feedback
mechanism. 7 3 However, in the end, they conclude more research is needed
to understand why trading up increased after 1997.174
To summarize, the research on the effects of the gain exclusion on
home sales is relatively sparse and, with respect specifically to the flipping
incentive, inconclusive. A complete understanding of the incentives and
their exact effects awaits further research, which will no doubt be
forthcoming-virtually every study in this area ends with a call for
additional research. For the time being, however, what is clear is that the
gain exclusion clearly increased the frequency of home sales, both trade-
ups and trade-downs-consequences that were not anticipated nor intended
at the time of its enactment. Moreover, even a remote possibility that the
gain exclusion contributed to the global financial crisis is sobering and
warrants a reconsideration of the law.
C. Complexity
The gain exclusion was supposed to streamline administration of the
law by eliminating the need to keep track of basis. However, as discussed
above, the difficulty of keeping track of basis was probably overstated.
Moreover, the argument that the gain exclusion would simplify the law
proves too much: it is always easier to impose no tax, but the costs of doing
so-lost revenue, unfairness, and efficiency-must be weighed against the
simplification benefits. Furthermore, the gain exclusion retains other
complexities of the rollover regime and introduces new ones.
For example, the determination of whether a property is the taxpayer's
residence and for how long the taxpayer has owned it and used it as such in
order to meet the requirements under I.R.C. § 121 is a complex inquiry that
incorporates prior law as well as extensive new regulations under I.R.C.
§ 121.17s
171. See id. at 19.
172. See id. at 18.
173. See id. at 18-19.
174. See id at 19.
175. See Dilley & Callihan, supra note 52, at 108-11 (describing prior law and possible
applicability to new 1.R.C. § 121); Dilley & Callihan, supra note 5, at 950-52 (discussing the prior law
relating to meaning of principal residence and its implications for planning under new I.R.C. § 121);
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Another area of burgeoning complexity relates to the reduced exclusion
where a taxpayer fails to satisfy the two-of-five use-and-ownership
requirement or the two-year limitation due to unforeseen circumstances.17 6
Exactly what constitutes "unforeseen circumstances" is an evolving and
expanding universe. 77  In regulations, the IRS specifies "unforeseen
circumstances" safe harbors that include involuntary conversion; natural or
man-made disasters or acts of war or terrorism resulting in a casualty to the
residence; cessation of employment; change in employment resulting in the
inability to pay housing costs and basic reasonable living expenses; death;
divorce or legal separation; and multiple births resulting from the same
pregnancy.' 78 In addition to the safe harbors, the reduced exclusion is also
available if the primary reason for the home sale relates to unforeseen
circumstances.' 7 9 Specific "unforeseen circumstances" in which the IRS
has ruled that the reduced exclusion is available include an adult child
Raby & Raby, supra note 5, at 1363-67 (discussing prior law definition of principal residence as it
applies to new I.R.C. § 121).
176. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
177. See David W. Randolph, "Unforeseen Circumstances" Exclusion from Gain on Sale of
Home, J. ACCT. (2009), http://www.joumalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2009/Nov/20091783.htm
(describing examples of unforeseen circumstances in IRS rulings and regulations); see also Gail
Richmond, When Buying a Home, Expect the Unexpected, 26 A.B.A. TAX SEC. NEWS Q., no. 3, 2007,
at 24 (same); James L. Wittenbach, Taking Advantage of the Reduced Maximum Exclusion on the Sale
ofa Principal Residence, CCH TAXES-THE TAX MAGAZINE, May 2008, at 39 (same).
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(e)(2) (2004). See generally Timothy R. Koski, Qualifying for the
Home Sale Exclusion Safe Harbor, 98 TAX NOTES 1551 (2003) (summarizing the regulations relating to
the reduced exclusion). Many of the listed safe harbors were suggested by the National Association of
Realtors, among other commentators, in response to a specific solicitation by the IRS for comments on
"unforeseen circumstances." See Letter from Linda Goold, Tax Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, to IRS
(Jan. 9, 2001), in Realtors Suggest Expanding 'Unforeseen Circumstances' of Home Sale Exclusion
Regs, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 22, 22 (2001); see also A.B.A SEC. TAX'N, Comments on Proposed
Regulations under Section 121 (May 1, 2001), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
tax/pubpolicy/2001/121irs0105.authcheckdam.pdf.
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(b). In determining the primary reason for the home sale, some of the
relevant factors
[I]nclude (but are not limited to) the extent to which-
(1) The sale or exchange and the circumstances giving rise to the sale or exchange are
proximate in time;
(2) The suitability of the property as the taxpayer's principal residence materially
changes;
(3) The taxpayer's financial ability to maintain the property is materially impaired;
(4) The taxpayer uses the property as the taxpayer's residence during the period of the
taxpayer's ownership of the property;
(5) The circumstances giving rise to the sale or exchange are not reasonably
foreseeable when the taxpayer begins using the property as the taxpayer's principal
residence; and
(6) The circumstances giving rise to the sale or exchange occur during the period of the
taxpayer's ownership and use of the property as the taxpayer's principal residence.
Id.
222
2013] Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales 223
moving back in with her parents;s caring for a disabled parent;18' a
pregnancy discovered after a relationship had ended; 182 a larger blended
family including adolescent children of the opposite sex;' 83 a traumatic
gunpoint robbery;18 4 an assault by neighbor and threats against and assault
on a son in a neighborhood with criminal activity; assault of a child on a
school bus, causing trauma and poor school performance;' 86 unforeseeable
aircraft noise;187 and a police officer joining a K-9 unit and needing to
move to a community that allowed animals.188 There are millions of
unreported home sales each year,189 and as a portion of them make their
way through the IRS audit process, there is no doubt that the courts will
add to the jurisprudence of "unforeseen circumstances."' 90
There are many other special rules under the gain exclusion that also
contribute to its complexity. These include rules relating to property of a
deceased spouse; property transferred to an individual by a spouse or
former spouse incident to divorce; property used by a former spouse
pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument; tenant-stockholders in a
cooperative housing corporation; gains attributable to depreciation;
involuntary conversions; taxpayers who become physically or mentally
incapable of self-care; sales of remainder interests; expatriates; and
property acquired from a decedent.191
180. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601023 (Sept. 30, 2005).
181. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200626024 (Mar. 23, 2006).
182. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rut. 200652041 (Sept. 30, 2005).
183. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200725018 (Mar. 15, 2007).
184. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200630004 (Apr. 28, 2006).
185. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601009 (Sept. 30, 2005).
186. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rut. 200820016 (Feb. 7, 2008).
187. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200702032 (Sept. 29, 2006).
188. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rut. 200504012 (Oct. 14, 2004).
189. The sales are unreported because the IRS eliminated broker reporting and taxpayer reporting
for most home sales. See infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text. As a practical matter, therefore,
the complex rules described here may end up not being applied in many cases in which they should be.
Nonetheless, the compliance and administration costs of these complex rules are still burdensome;
conscientious taxpayers who sell their homes each year must still consider the possible applicability and
consequences of the complex rules, and the IRS must do the same for home sales that are subject to
audit.
190. To date (Feb. 25, 2013), there are only two reported cases on the issue. See Chiarito v.
Comm'r., T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-149, at *3 (2010) (finding that the need to build an industrial kitchen
and the losses incurred by the taxpayers' catering business did not constitute unforeseen circumstances
requiring them to sell their house because they knew of this circumstance when they bought the house);
Gates v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 1, 13 n.17 (2010) (finding that taxpayers did not demonstrate that the
"unsustainable" debt they incurred to construct their house qualified as unforeseen circumstances); see
also Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REv. 645, 662-65
(2003) (discussing the extreme complexity created by the "unforeseen circumstances" aspect of I.R.C.
§ 121 and arguing that there is no easy way to reduce it).




The gain exclusion presents many opportunities to avoid paying tax on
a home sale gain. Some tax avoidance strategies are arguably within the
letter of the law, but upon learning of them, Congress has curtailed them. 19 2
Other strategies, such as dividing ownership among family members so that
each family member can make use of a separate exclusion amount,
continue to be viable. Other strategies lack even the patina of legitimacy
but are difficult to police. One example of this is the reported practice of
taxpayers who own high-value houses "swapping" them back and forth
every two years in order to "freshen" their basis and shelter the maximum
amount of gain every two years. 93
Perhaps the most serious abuse of the gain exclusion is its use by
professional "fixer-uppers," who buy, renovate, and resell properties. 194
Some of these individuals may not even have a colorable claim to have
satisfied the requirements of I.R.C. § 121, and if they are found to be
dealers in such property, any gains they realize should be taxed as ordinary
income.195 Some of these individuals may claim to satisfy the two-year use-
and-ownership requirement and other requirements of I.R.C. § 121.196 As
the following discussion makes clear, the IRS has little ability to monitor or
enforce against avoidance behaviors.
E. Compliance
The avoidance problems described above are compounded by the fact
that the 1997 Act repealed broker reporting for home sales governed by
I.R.C. § 121.'9' This provision has been completely unnoticed, but its
impact cannot be overstated.
Broker reporting is part of the extensive network of information
reporting requirements that plays a crucial role in tax compliance. 19 8
192. For example, the exclusion is now restricted where a taxpayer converts a vacation or
investment property to a principal residence, or where a taxpayer acquires property in a like-kind
exchange and converts it into use as a principal residence. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(5), (d)(10); supra notes
58-61 and accompanying text.
193. See GRAVELLE & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 11.
194. See id. at 10; Auten & Gravelle, supra note 139, at 107.
195. See James A. Fellows & Michael A. Yuhas, When Is Real Estate a Capital Asset, and When
Is It Not?, CPA J. (July 2007), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2007/707/essentials/p42.htm.
196. Even in these cases, there is an argument that this gain ought to be taxed because it is
attributable to the untaxed labor income of the individual. See GRAVELLE & JACKSON, supra note 139,
at 10.
197. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
198. Other transactions or payments subject to information reporting include dividends, I.R.C.
§ 6042 (2006); interest, I.R.C. § 6049 (2006); and "rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities,
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income"
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Information reporting is second to withholding in terms of its effectiveness
in increasing compliance. 199 Its importance will continue to increase with
the technological advances and globalized economy of the twenty-first
century. 200 However, despite the proven efficacy of information reporting,
I.R.C. § 6045(e)(5) (1997) repealed it for most home sales.
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6045(e)(5), the IRS eliminated broker reporting for
home sales with gross proceeds of no more than $250,000 ($500,000 in the
case of married taxpayers filing jointly) as long as the seller of the home
provides written assurances about the selling price of the house and the
seller meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 121 relating to use and ownership
of the house.2 0 1 At the same time, although not required by the 1997 law to
do so, the IRS also eliminated the requirement that taxpayers themselves
report home sales where they claim an exclusion under I.R.C. § 121.202 In
effect, taxpayers are on the "honor system" as to their eligibility to exclude
gains from home sales. Because neither the taxpayers nor brokers are
required to report home sales with gains claimed to be excluded under
made in the course of a trade or business, I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2006). For a list of common payments
subject to information reporting see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, A GUIDE TO INFORMATION
RETURNS (2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdflil099gi.pdf
199. For example, in its most recent study of 2006 data, the IRS found that amounts subject to
both withholding and substantial information reporting (i.e., wages and salaries) were misreported by
1%. Amounts subject to substantial information reporting only (i.e., dividends, interests, pensions and
annuities, unemployment compensation and Social Security benefits) were misreported by 8%.
Amounts subject to some information reporting (i.e., deductions, exemptions, partnership and
Subchapter S income, capital gains and alimony income) were misreported by 11%. Income not subject
to either withholding or information reporting (i.e., nonfarm proprietor income, rents and royalties, farm
income, income from sales of business property) was underreported by 56%. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., TAx GAP FOR THE TAx YEAR 2006, OVERVIEW, JAN. 12, 2012, chart 1,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview tax gap_2006.pdf; see also Tax Gap: Multiple Strategies,
Better Compliance Data, and Long-Term Goals Are Needed to Improve Taxpayer Compliance: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt, Gov't Info., and Int'l Sec., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Michael Brostek, Director of Strategic
Issues, GAO), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06208t.pdf (putting the rate of
noncompliance for income subject to some information reporting at 7.1% and for income subject to
substantial information reporting at 4.2%); see also Kahng, supra note 40, at 323-24.
200. See Douglas H. Shulman, IRS Comm'r, Prepared Remarks Before the American Payroll
Association and the American Accounts Payable Association (May 27, 2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Prepared-Remarks-of-IRS-Commissioner-Douglas-H.-Shulman-Before-the-
American-Payroll-Association-and-the-American-Accounts-Payable-Association (providing history of
information reporting and noting its increased importance in light of the technology revolution and
global economy).
201. See Rev. Proc. 2007-12, 2007-1 C.B. 354.
202. Prior to the 1997 Act, the IRS had required taxpayers to file Form 2119 for sales of principal
residences. In 1998, the IRS declared Form 2119 obsolete and instead requires certain home sales to be
reported on Form 1040, Schedule D, relating to Capital Gains and Losses. DEP'T OF THE TREAS.,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 523, SELLING YOUR HOME 1 (for use in preparing 1998 returns),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p523--1998.pdf. However, taxpayers were instructed not to report
home sales in which they had gains that were fully excluded under I.R.C. § 121. See id. at 15. This
directive not to report continues to be in effect today. See DEP'T OF THE TREAS., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., PUB. NO. 523, SELLING YOUR HOME 19 (for use in preparing 2012 returns),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p523.pdf.
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I.R.C. § 121, it is virtually impossible for the IRS effectively to administer
the gain exclusion.203 In addition, it is impossible to ascertain how many
taxpayers claim gain exclusions, the amounts of the exclusions they claim,
and the frequency with which they claim exclusions.
The lack of information regarding I.R.C. § 121 is acutely apparent in
the study of reported residence sales conducted by economists Gerald
Auten and Jane G. Gravelle.204 Using IRS data from 2007 tax returns,
Auten and Gravelle identify approximately 368,000 reported home sales,
351,000 of which appear to be principal residence sales. 205 Of these
reported principal residence sales, they estimate that as many as 274,000,
or 78%, involve excluded gains under § I.R.C. 121.206
The 368,000 reported home sales that Auten and Gravelle studied
represent only 6.5% of the 5.674 million sales of existing homes in 2007.207
Thus, taxpayers did not report the other 5.3 million home sales for the year.
If one assumes, as Auten and Gravelle found with respect to reported sales,
that 78% of these taxpayers claimed gain exclusions, this would mean there
are an additional 4.13 million unreported home sales in which taxpayers
claimed gain exclusions. However, this may not be a useful computation
because it appears that many of the taxpayers who reported their home
sales should not have done so because they claimed their gains were
entirely excludable under I.R.C. § 121.208 In other words, the percentage of
taxpayers who reported their home sales and claimed gain exclusions
should be much lower than the 78% Auten and Gravelle found.2 09 At the
203. The only way the IRS can identify home sales for which the exclusion was improperly
claimed is through the audit process. In 2010, the IRS audited only 1.1 percent of returns filed by
individuals. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 55B, DATA BOOK 2010
tbl. 9a, at 22 (2011).
204. See Auten & Gravelle, supra note 139, at 103-04.
205. The other 17,000 appear to be sales of vacation homes or second or third residences. See id.
at 105.
206. See id. The uncertainty in their estimates arises from incomplete or inaccurate taxpayer
reporting. Id.
207. The figure for total existing home sales comes from the National Association of Realtors.
See id. Auten and Gravelle found that a total of 368,000 apparent home sales, of which about 17,200
appeared to be sales of secondary residences and vacation homes. See id. In addition, they speculate that
some of the remaining 351,000 may be rental or investment properties that do not qualify for gain
exclusion under I.R.C. § 121, but they do not have enough information to ascertain this. See id.
208. Auten and Gravelle found that of the total 351,000 principal residence sales, 98,600
taxpayers reported taxable gains and 37,000 reported losses. See id. The implication is that the
remaining 215,000 of reported sales may have involved gains that were entirely excluded under I.R.C.
§ 121. It is likely that most of these sales should not even have been reported by the taxpayers, as the
IRS no longer requires taxpayer reporting if the taxpayer claims the gain exclusion. See supra note 202
and accompanying text.
209. One possible explanation for this over-reporting by taxpayers is that brokers sometimes file
information returns when not necessary, either out of carelessness or an abundance of caution or
because they are not knowledgeable about the reporting exemption. If a taxpayer receives an
unnecessary information return from the broker, he may in turn report the home sale on his return out of
an abundance of caution or because he mistakenly believes he is required to.
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same time, the percentage of taxpayers who did not report their home sales
and claimed gain exclusions should be very high. A more accurate estimate
might assume that almost all of the 5.3 million unreported home sales
involved gains claimed to be excluded.
Under either analysis, it is clear that there were several million
unreported home sales in 2007 in which taxpayers claimed gain exclusions
under I.R.C. § 121. These home sales were probably not reported by
brokers either because of the broker reporting exemption described
above. 210 The most notable revelation of Auten and Gravelle's study is that
every year, there are millions of home sales and billions of unreported
gains about which the IRS has no information. It does not know who the
selling taxpayers are, how much gain they have realized, how long they
have claimed to own and use their homes as principal residences, and
whether they have met the other requirements of I.R.C. § 121.
In summary, a reassessment of the policy rationales for the 1997 law
reveals them to be unpersuasive in many respects. The administrative
concerns related to basis recordkeeping under the rollover regime were
overstated and underexamined. The gain exclusion retains much of the
complexity of the prior law and also creates substantial new complexities.
Furthermore, by reason of an obscure procedural loophole, the gain
exclusion is virtually unenforceable. Finally, while the effects of the buy-
up incentive under the rollover regime were problematic, and were
mitigated by the gain exclusion, the gain exclusion also created other
incentive effects. The impact of these new incentive effects is not yet fully
understood, but the possibility that the gain exclusion contributed to the
real estate bubble is troubling.
The next Part turns to the question of how to reform the law. In
considering where we want to go with tax subsidies for home sales, it
strives to step away from the constraints of path dependence and bounded
rationality and to address the broader tax and social policy questions
implicated by this inquiry.
IV. WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE?
In assessing where we should go from here, this Part provides a
broader framework that takes account of systemic incentives under the tax
law and also considers the role of homeownership as a means to promote
race and gender equality in the distribution of wealth. With these broader
210. Auten and Gravelle report that 3.36 million real estate information returns were filed in
2007. However, because most principal residence sales are exempt from broker reporting, they indicate
that most of these are likely to be nonresidential real estate transactions and non-principal residence
sales. See id. at 107.
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considerations in mind, it then proposes specific reforms for the taxation of
home sales.
A. Revisiting Incentives
In evaluating the incentive effects of the tax treatment of home sales-
whether the rollover regime or the gain exclusion-the bigger picture has
been overlooked. It is important to keep in mind that even in the absence of
the rollover regime and the gain exclusion, gains on home sales would be
tax-preferred in the same way that all capital gains are-they are taxed at
rates substantially lower than other sources of income.211
This general capital gains preference is intended to ameliorate a
systemic incentive relating to the taxation of all capital gains-the lock-in
effect. The lock-in effect is a product of our realization based system-the
imposition of a tax at the time of the sale or exchange of assets acts as a toll
charge on such sales or exchanges, thereby impairing mobility of capital
and resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources. 2 12 The lock-in effect
is "probably the most widely publicized argument" in favor of the reduced
rate of tax on capital gains.213
Against this backdrop of the general capital gains preference, both the
rollover regime and the gain exclusion can be seen as "super-preferences"
which treat a particular capital asset-owner-occupied housing-even
more preferentially than other capital assets. Both the rollover regime and
the gain exclusion provide extra mitigation of the general lock-in problem
described above, but each creates new, undesirable incentives.
The rollover regime created the buy-up incentive, whereby a home
seller had to buy a house of equal or greater value to avoid a capital gains
tax-a sort of "micro lock-in" effect, in which people could move their
capital freely as long as they kept it in owner-occupied housing.
211. As of 2013, the maximum nominal federal income tax rates on ordinary income and capital
gains are 39.6% and 20%, respectively. (The actual maximum rates are higher because of the phase-out
of deductions for high-income taxpayers and the healthcare tax on capital gains.) With a few brief
exceptions, capital gains have been taxed at preferential rates for the entire history of the income tax.
See GREGG A. ESENWEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-473 E, INDIVIDUAL CAPITAL GAINS INCOME:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (2007).
212. See generally RICHARD B. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 197-200 (rev. ed. 1964);
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 434-35
(3d ed. 1980); Joseph J. Minarik, Capital Gains, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 241,
244-45 (Henry A. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981).
213. Walter J. Blum, A Handy Guide of the Capital Gains Arguments, 44 TAX NOTES 1145, 1152
(1989). As Blum observes, the lock-in effect is not caused by the taxation of capital gains, but rather is
caused by the failure to tax those gains as they accrue. See id. Another way to eliminate the lock-in
problem would be to move away from a realization-based system of tax. See Mary Louise Fellows, A
Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1990).
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The incentive effects of the gain exclusion operate differently from
those of the rollover regime-people are no longer penalized for moving
capital from owner occupied housing to other investments. However, the
gain exclusion, by reason of its zero rate of tax on gains from owner-
occupied housing, creates a positive incentive for people to keep their
capital in owner occupied housing, so there is still a "micro lock-in"
problem. Moreover, the gain exclusion also adds a flipping incentive, with
all of its attendant problems.
Whether the systemic lock-in effect, alone or in combination with other
reasons, justifies the general capital gains preference is hotly debated, and
beyond the scope of this Article to address comprehensively. If one accepts
the validity of a general capital gains preference, the question remains
whether providing extra-preferential treatment to owner-occupied housing
is worth the costs of the "micro lock-in" problem that such extra-
preferential treatment creates.
Certainly, there are arguments why owner-occupied housing is a
unique capital asset that warrants special treatment.214 Other capital
assets-such as stocks, bonds and other financial assets-are relatively
substitutable and an individual owning a diversified portfolio of such assets
can plan purchases and sales to minimize lock-in effects.215 In contrast, a
residence is a large and unique capital asset; therefore, the gain is not easily
sheltered.216 Moreover, the reasons for selling one residence and buying
another may involve nonfinancial considerations such as changing family
size. 217 Finally, and perhaps most important, changing residences may be
directly related to a change in geographic location for employment
reasons.218 Any tax, even a preferential capital gains tax, creates a barrier to
labor mobility, which undermines economic productivity. 219
The arguments for a super-preference for gains on home sales are
persuasive, and yet, there are countervailing considerations. As has been
214. See GRAVELLE & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 6; Burman,Wallace & Weiner, supra note 80,
at 382-83. Other "special" assets that receive preferred treatment-over and above the reduced capital
gains rate-include property received in a like-kind exchange and involuntarily converted property. See
supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
215. See GRAVELLE & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 6; Burman,Wallace & Weiner, supra note 80,
at 383.
216. See Burman,Wallace & Weiner, supra note 80, at 383.
217. See GRAVELLE & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 6; Auten & Reschovsky, supra note 139, at
8-9.
218. See GRAVELLE & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 5-6; Auten & Gravelle, supra note 139, at
107.
219. GRAVELLE & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 5; Auten & Gravelle, supra note 139, at 107. One
study has found that labor mobility increased as a result of the 1997 law. See Zachary W. Richard, Does
the Exclusion of Capital Gains Taxes on Housing Really Promote Labor Mobility? 26-27 (Aug. 2009)




discussed above, both of the super-preferences with which we have
experience-the rollover regime and the gain exclusion-have had
unintended adverse consequences. Moreover, one of the strongest
arguments for a "super preference"-that it reduces friction on labor
mobility-is a double-edged sword: a tax preference for gains on home
sales also encourages overconsumption of housing, which can lead to more
people owning houses instead of renting or inflated housing prices. Some
economists believe that high homeownership rates, which have been
promoted by government policies including tax subsidies, have an adverse
impact on labor mobility that outweighs the benefit in terms of
employment.2 20 If this is true, then a super preference for gain on homes
sales adversely affects labor mobility.
Furthermore, research emerging in the aftermath of the global financial
crisis suggests labor mobility may be affected differently depending on
housing market conditions. For example, one recent study found that in a
"down" real estate market, homeowners' mobility is reduced because
homeowners may not want to sell their homes at a loss, especially if their
mortgage exceeds the selling price, or they may not be able to find a buyer
easily.22 1 In this situation, a super preference for gains on home sales will
not help mobility at all, as homeowners contemplating a move face the
prospects of losses, not gains.
Finally, as is discussed below in the Conclusion, the gain exclusion is
not the only tax preference for homeownership. Other preferences amplify
the "micro lock-in" incentive that encourages people to keep their capital in
owner-occupied housing. As a result, the costs of the incentive, in terms of
overinvestment in housing and underinvestment elsewhere, are extremely
high. It seems unlikely that they would be outweighed by the benefits of a
super preference for gains on home sales.
B. Wealth and Homeownership
Federal tax and housing policies promoting homeownership are
premised in part on the assumption that homeownership can lead to private
220. See Andrew Oswald, The Housing Market and Europe's Unemployment (May 1999)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://individual.utoronto.ca/helderman/Oswald.pdf; see also
HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE LABOUR MARKET IN EUROPE (Casper van Ewijk & Michiel van
Leuvensteijn eds., 2009) (providing empirical evidence for and expanding upon Oswald's hypothesis
that the barriers homeownership creates in terms of labor mobility outweigh the benefits of
homeownership in terms of increased likelihood of being employed, and that consequently, government
subsidies for homeownership should be reduced).
221. See Fernando Ferreira, Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy, Housing Busts and Household
Mobility, 68 J. URB. ECON. 34 (2010).
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wealth accumulation.2 2 2 Promoting increased levels of homeownership-in
particular among women and minorities-was a central agenda item of
both the Clinton and the George W. Bush administrations, with the explicit
goal of improving the economic status of these disadvantaged groups. 2 2 3
The gender and race dimensions of wealth inequality in the United
States are indisputable and deeply troubling. Women of all races are less
wealthy than men, and the wealth disparity is particularly acute for single
women of color.224 That women are poorer than men is not a new
observation: the "feminization of poverty" 225 has been studied extensively
by feminist and poverty law scholars.22 6
Until recently, however, a more comprehensive picture of wealth
inequalities between men and women-taking into account race, life stage,
marital status-was obscured by the fact that most women spent most of
their adult lives in marriage and were assumed to share resources with their
husbands. Now, for the first time in history, more than half of adult women
in the United States are single.227 Single women are now a significant
demographic group whose wealth holdings can be ascertained. This has
revealed the disturbing findings described above-that women are less
wealthy than men across the board, with women of color occupying the
lowest rungs of the economic ladder.
That race, along with gender, plays a role in wealth inequalities in the
U.S. is, sadly, not surprising. In their seminal book, Black Wealth/White
Wealth, Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro describe the phenomenon of
222. Jordan Rappaport, The Effectiveness of Homeownership in Building Household Wealth, FED.
RES. BANK OF KAN. ECON. REV. 35, 36 (4th Quarter 2010), https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/
econrev/pdf/l0q4Rappaport.pdf. ("Conventional wisdom has long suggested that homeownership is an
effective way to build household wealth. Consistent with this belief, homeownership is often considered
to be a key part of the American Dream.").
223. See infra notes 229, 231 and accompanying text.
224. A recent study found that single black and Hispanic women have one penny of wealth for
every dollar of wealth owned by their single male counterparts and a small fraction of a penny for every
dollar of wealth owned by white women. Excluding vehicle ownership, single black women have a
median wealth of $100 and Hispanic women, of $120, as compared to their black and Hispanic male
counterparts, who have a median wealth of $7,900, and $9,730, respectively. Single white women have
a median wealth of $41,500, See Mariko Chang & Meizhu Lui, Lifting as We Climb: Women of Color,
Wealth, and America's Future, INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV. 5 (Spring 2010),
http://www.insightcced.org/uploads/CRWG/LiftingAsWeClimb-WomenWealth-Report-InsightCenter-
Spring2010.pdf.
225. This phrase was first used by Diana Pearce to describe the increased risk of poverty for
divorced women. See Diana Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, II URB.
& Soc. CHANGE REV. 28 (1978).
226. See generally THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY: ONLY IN AMERICA? (Gertrude Schaffner
Goldberg & Eleanor Kremen eds., 1990); HILDA SCOTT, WORKING YOUR WAY TO THE BOTTOM: THE
FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY (1984); Sara S. McLanahan & Erin L. Kelly, The Feminization ofPoverty:
Past and Future, in HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 127 (Janet Saltzmman Chafetz ed.,
1999).
227. See Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 663-64 (2010).
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entrenched economic inequality between blacks and whites in the United
States, which they call the "sedimentation of racial inequality."2 28 The
phrase powerfully evokes the image of today's economic inequality as
constructed from past layers of stunted opportunities and scarce
resources-the result of discriminatory practices and policies stretching
back in time over many generations. In keeping with Oliver and Shapiro's
thesis about the deep intransigence of this problem, the most recent data
indicates that racial wealth inequalities not only persist, but are
worsening. 229
Similar patterns of wealth distribution can be seen in homeownership.
African Americans and Latinos own lower value homes than whites and
have homeownership rates that are lower than whites' by twenty
percentage points or more.230 Married couples-in particular, white married
couples-own homes at well above the national average.23 1 Single people
of color own homes at the lowest rates and with the lowest values. 2 32
Given the similar inequalities in wealth distribution in general on the
one hand, and homeownership on the other, it is easy to see why
homeownership has been embraced by many progressives as a means to
228. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 51 (1995).
229. In relative terms, the "wealth gap" between non-Hispanic white and African-American
families increased more than fourfold between 1984 and 2007. The absolute values are equally stark: in
2007, the median value of wealth holdings (excluding home equity) for white families was $100,000;
for African-American families, $5,000. See Thomas M. Shapiro, Tatjana Meschede, & Laura Sullivan,
The Racial Wealth Gap Increases Fourfold, INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL'Y (May 2010), http://www.
insightcced.orgluploads/CRWG/IASP-Racial-Wealth-Gap-Brief-May2O I 0.pdf. Similar wealth
disparities exist between non-Hispanic white and Hispanic families. In 2002, the median wealth of
Hispanic households was $7,932, as compared to a median wealth of $88,651 for white households. See
Rakesh Kochhar, The Wealth of Hispanic Households: 1996 to 2002, PEW HISPANIC CTR. 5 (Oct. 18,
2004), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/34.pdf. And as the number of single women has increased, it
is now possible to discern, within each layer of racial inequality, an even more finely grained
sedimentation: women are trapped at the bottom of each layer, with dire consequences for themselves
and their dependents.
230. See Beverlyn Lundy Allen, Race and Gender Inequality in Homeownership: Does Place
Make a Diference?, 67 RURAL SOC. 603, 613-14 (2002); Hayward D. Horton & Melvin E. Thomas,
Race, Class and Family Structure: Differences in Housing Values for Black and White Homeowners, 68
SOC. INQUIRY 114, 132 (1998); Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, Trends in Homeownership:
Race, Demographics, and Income, 22 ECON. PERSP. 53, 55-59 (1998); Raphael W. Bostic & Brian J.
Surette, Have the Doors Opened Wider? Trends in Homeownership Rates by Race and Income 6 (Fed.
Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2000-31, 2000); Stanley A. Sedo & Sherrie A. Kossoudji, Rooms of
One's Own: Gender, Race and Homeownership as Wealth Accumulation in the United States 1, 27
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 1397, 2004), available at http://ftp.iza.org/
dpl397.pdf.
231. See Loma Fox, Re-Possessing "Home": A Re-Analysis of Gender, Homeownership and
Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 463 (2008); Lori
Latrice Sykes, A Home ofHer Own: An Analysis ofAsset Ownership for Non-Married Black and White
Women, 42 Soc. SCI. J. 273, 278 (2005).
232. See MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS WEALTH AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 82 (2010); Sykes, supra note 231, at 282.
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ameliorate race and gender inequalities in the distribution of wealth.233
Mariko Lin Chang conceptualizes homeownership as an entr6e to what she
calls the "wealth escalator"-the variety of financial benefits such as
employee fringe benefits, favorable tax laws, and government benefits that
enable individuals to accumulate more wealth more quickly.234 Like many
others, Chang advocates making homeownership more accessible to
remedy wealth inequality. 23 5
The goal of increasing levels of homeownership among minorities and
women was embraced by the Clinton Administration as part of its
sprawling plan to increase homeownership.236 Perhaps more surprisingly, it
was then co-opted by the Bush Administration. In George W. Bush's vision
for an "ownership society," homeownership was portrayed as an equal-
opportunity path to individual financial empowerment and upward
mobility:
For millions of our citizens, the American Dream starts with
owning a home. Homeownership gives people a sense of pride and
independence and confidence for the future. When you work hard,
like you've done, and there are good policies coming out of our
Nation's Capital, we're creating a home-an ownership society in
this country where more Americans than ever will be able to open
up their door where they live and say, "Welcome to my house.
Welcome to my piece of property."237
233. See, e.g., Sedo & Kossoudji, supra note 230, at 1, 27; Thomas M. Shapiro, Race,
Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 53, 53 (2006) ("Closing the racial wealth gap
must be at the forefront of the civil rights agenda in the twenty-first century... . [H]omeownership is an
appropriate strategy to attack the racial wealth gap."). But see Nancy A. Denton, Housing As a Means of
Asset Accumulation: A Good Strategy for the Poor?, in ASSETS FOR THE POOR 232 (Thomas M. Shapiro
& Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001) (arguing that promoting homeownership is not an effective strategy for
reducing racial wealth inequalities).
Scholars have studied the disparate racial impacts of tax subsidies for homeownership and observed that
the benefits of the subsidies are disproportionately enjoyed by white and high-income taxpayers. See
Brown, supra note 5; Martinez & Martinez, supra note 5; Moran & Whitford, supra note 5; Powell,
supra note 5. Some of them have proposed that the tax subsidies be reformed so that more of them are
received by disadvantaged groups. See Brown, supra note 5, at 368-74; Moran & Whitford supra note
5, at 801-02. Implicit in these proposals is that increased homeownership by these groups is a desirable
goal. This Article seeks to challenge that implicit assumption.
234. See CHANG, supra note 232, at 40-52, 81-83.
235. See id. at 133.
236. See Whitney Ross, Origin of the Housing Bubble: "The National Homeownership Strategy,"
THE AFFORDABLE MORTGAGE DEPRESSION (Mar. 11, 2010, 3:03 PM), http://theaffordablemortgage
depression.com/2010/03/I /origin-of-the-housing-bubble-the-national-homeownership-strategy.aspx.
237. George W. Bush, President's Remarks to the National Association of Homebuilders (Oct. 2,
2004) (transcript available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-book3/pdf/PPP-2004-book3-
doc-pg2323.pdf). Lobbyists have also played a central role in promoting homeownership as "the single
best long-term investment for most Americans. It is a primary source of wealth and financial security
for many households, helping to provide for education, retirement and more." Homeownership Works
233
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As part of his ambitious agenda to promote homeownership, President
Bush, with the eager support of the real estate lobby, targeted minorities
* -* 238with special initiatives.
However, as the last decade has proved, homeownership is not always
a ride on the "wealth escalator." Indeed, evidence from the subprime
mortgage crisis indicates that homeownership can cause a precipitous
descent down that escalator, especially for people of color.2 39 The subprime
mortgage market and the real estate bubble inflicted harms on many
homeowners, 24 0 but minority homeowners and their communities were
particularly hard hit.2 4 1
This recent history with homeownership as a remedy for wealth
inequality casts doubt on the ability of the government to effect socio-
economic change in this way. More fundamentally, it raises questions
about whether and to what extent private wealth accumulation ought to be
the goal of a just and fair society.
C Proposals for Reform
The history of tax preferences for home sales reveals that the gain
exclusion rests upon questionable policy justifications, flawed logical
reasoning, and poor design choices. Moreover, it is difficult to justify a
super preference for owner-occupied housing relative to other capital
assets, especially when the consequences of doing so have been shown to
be unpredictable and possibly very damaging. Moreover, the events of
for America, NAT'L ASS'N OF HOME BUILDERS, http://www.nahb.org/fileUploaddetails.aspx?
contentlD=175788http://www.nahb.org/fileUpload-details.aspx?contentlD=175788 (last visited Aug.
21, 2013).
238. See Press Release, White House, President Hosts Conference on Minority Homeownership
(Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021015.html; NAR, NAHB Endorse While House, HUD Minority Housing Initiative, REALTY
TIMES (June 18, 2002), http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20020618_housinginitiative.htm.
239. See Raul Hinojosa Ojeda, Albert Jacquez & Paule Cruz Takash, The End of the American
Dream for Blacks and Latinos 15-20 (William C. Velasquez Inst., Working Paper, 2009),
http://www.wcvi.org/data/pub/wcvi whitepaper housing june2009.pdf; Amaad Rivera et al.,
Foreclosed: State of the American Dream, UNITED FOR A FAIR ECON. 1-31 (2008), available at
http://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/report-rivera-et-
al_l.pdf.
240. The Government Accountability Office has estimated that wealth losses from the decline in
home equity could reach $9 trillion. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180,
FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 21-23 (2013). As of
December 2011, home mortgage debt exceeded home equity value by $3.7 trillion. See id at 21. See
generally A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not
Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 207-13 (2009) (describing the economic and social costs of
home mortgage financing).
241. See Ojeda, Jacquez & Takash, supra note 239, at 15-22 (describing how African Americans
and Latinos borrowed using subprime mortgages at disproportionately high levels and how they have
suffered disproportionately severe declines in wealth); see also Rivera et al., supra note 239, at 4-16.
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recent years have called into question fundamental premises about the
value of homeownership and the government's role in promoting it.
In light of these considerations, the gain exclusion should be repealed,
and no special tax preference for home sales beyond the normal capital
gains preference should be substituted in its place. Rather, gains on home
sales ought to be taxed in the same manner as other capital gains.
This proposal will strike some as extreme, but it is certainly within the
realm of possibility.2 42 One obvious objection will relate to liquidity-that
a taxpayer who sells a home and buys a new one will not have the funds to
pay a tax on the gain from the sale. Another complaint will be the unfair
surprise of imposing a tax on gains from home sales when such gains
largely have been exempt from tax for decades. A third objection will be
that taxing home sales will have a dampening effect on the housing market
at a time when the recovery of that market is viewed as crucial to a broader
economic recovery, or that it will cause other adverse economic effects.
The liquidity and the unfair shock problems are relatively minor, at
least for the time being, for two principal reasons. First, capital gains rates
are at historic lows (zero or five percent) for all but the top one percent of
taxpayers, whose capital gains rate is also quite low (twenty percent).243
Second, few taxpayers own homes with large unrealized gains. Many
homes that might have a very low historic basis due to the rollover regime
have either been sold since the 1997 law was enacted, or have been
transferred through inheritance-which means their bases have been
"freshened."244 After 1997, the real estate bubble resulted in an enormous
run up in home values, but most of this appreciation has been erased as the
bubble has deflated. As of 2012, home prices had returned to 2002
levels.245 In the short term, then, most people who sell their homes will not
242. See Kenneth R. Harney, Capital-Gains Tax Exclusion for Homeowners Might Fall Victim to
Deficit Deal, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-
02/news/35503629_Ihome-sale-gains-capital-gains-tax-exclusion-tax-code; see also Calvin H.
Johnson, Jr., Taxation of the Really Big House, 122 TAx NOTES 915 (2009) (proposing to repeal I.R.C.
§ 121 and tax gains on home sales at capital gains rates).
243. See Laura Saunders, High Earners Facing First Major Tax Increase in Years, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 2, 2013, at Al. In addition, many high-income taxpayers are likely to have capital loss carryovers
from recent years that they can deduct against gains on home sales.
244. It is estimated that it takes about fifteen years for half of single-family homebuyers to move
out of homes they purchased. Paul Emrath, How Long Buyers Remain in their Homes,
HOUSINGECONOMICS.COM (FEB. 11, 2009), http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?sectionlD=734&
genericContentlD=Il0770&channellD=311 (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).
245. See Les Christie, Home Prices Lowest Since 2002, CNN MONEY (April 24, 2012, 12:24
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/24/realestate/home-prices/index.htm. In recent months, however,
home prices have started to climb. See Catherine Rampell, Sudden Rise in Home Demand Takes
Builders by Surprise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/2l/business/
economy/in-us-surprise-housing-demand-catches-industry-off-guard.html?src=me&ref-general;
REUTERS, Home Prices Surge More Than 5%, the Most Since 2006, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/business/home-prices-up-5-5-from-a-year-ago.html?ref-
standardpoorscaseshillerhomepriceindex (reporting that home sale prices rose 12% during 2012).
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incur large tax liabilities. For those who would owe a large tax, a variety of
mechanisms could be used to ease any hardship. Those whose ownership
predates the 1997 law could be allowed the current law's gain exclusion
under a grandfather provision. For others owing a substantial tax, the
payment of tax could be spread over a number of years.
The impacts of repealing the gain exclusion on the housing market or
other aspects of the economy are difficult to predict. It is possible that
housing prices would decline, which could compound the short-term
problems we are experiencing with the substantial correction in the housing
market.24 6 On the other hand, prices might rise, as homeowners facing a tax
will be more reluctant to sell.247 It seems plausible that a tax would
generate incentive effects opposite to those of the exclusion-that
homeowners might become less mobile and that home sale frequency
might decrease.248 However, at least one study indicates that a tax on home
sales has the greatest effect-in terms of increased price and decreased sale
frequency-on homes held primarily for investment, with little effect on
principal residences. 24 9 This suggests that the impact on labor mobility of a
tax on principal residence might not be as great as some would predict.
CONCLUSION
This Article recommends what some might consider to be a radical
change in law-the repeal of the exclusion for gains on home sales and a
return to taxing those gains in the same manner as other capital gains, as
was done more than sixty years ago. At the same time, the Article has
argued that path dependence, having taken us long and far down the path of
tax subsidies for home sales, makes it extremely difficult to reverse course.
Are the reforms proposed here even possible under this path dependent
account?
246. Several studies of real property taxes have found that real property prices fall when these
taxes are imposed. See John D. Benjamin, Edward N. Coulson & Shiawee X. Yang, Real Estate
Transfer Taxes and Property Values: The Philadelphia Story, 7 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 151 (1993);
Benjamin Dachis, Gilles Duranton & Matthew A. Turner, Sand in the Gears: Evaluating the Effects of
Toronto's Land Transfer Tax (C.D. Howe Inst., Working Paper No. 277, 2008), available at
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary 277.pdf; SARA JOHNSON & ASIEH MANSOUR, THE IMPACTS
OF A REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX ON THE MASSACHUSETTS ECONOMY (1997). However, transfer
taxes differ greatly from capital gains taxes, so it is not clear that these findings are transferable to a
capital gains tax.
247. See Nicole Aregger, Martin Brown & Enzo Rossi, Can a Transaction Tax or Capital Gains
Tax Smooth House Prices? 24 (Sept. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1780826 (finding that capital gains taxes on home
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Path dependence theorists posit that change is sometimes possible.
Among the mechanisms or conditions they identify that can prompt change,
two are particularly promising here.2 50 The first is learning-that is, we can
learn from our mistakes and the mistakes of others and make corrections.25 1
One principal goal of this Article is to contribute to such learning in the
hope that it will reveal mistakes and lead to correction.
What we have learned from our experience with tax subsidies for home
sales is that special tax preferences can be harmful in unpredictable and
significant ways and that once they establish a toehold, they are difficult to
reverse. More generally, the complexity of the tax legislative process-the
intertwined policy and politics, the presence of highly organized and
powerful interest groups, and the difficulties of foreseeing and quantifying
the economic impacts of tax preference-casts doubt on the wisdom of
using the tax law to effectuate social and economic policies. Moreover,
based on our recent experience with the housing market and its particularly
adverse impacts on minority homeowners and communities, we must
reevaluate how the government can more effectively promote equality and
prosperity. Finally, we must confront the fundamental questions of whether
an "ownership society" should be our vision of a just and fair society, and,
if not, what the alternatives might be.
In addition to learning, a second condition that can prompt change is
the occurrence of an "exogenous shock"-an unforeseen event that alters a
252 Tegoa
previously stable arrangement. The global financial crisis is just such an
exogenous shock. It has caused lawmakers and policymakers to question
their basic assumptions about the desirability of homeownership and the
role of the federal government in promoting homeownership, laying the
groundwork for law reform. Furthermore, the crisis has brought an
increased urgency to the serious fiscal challenges we must confront. As
part of any solution to our budgetary woes, there is near unanimity that tax
expenditures must be curtailed.253
As we contemplate cuts in tax expenditures, tax subsidies for
homeownership demand especially close scrutiny for several important
reasons. First, they are extremely costly. The three largest homeownership
subsidies-the home mortgage interest deduction, the exclusion of gains
from home sales, and the state and local property tax deduction-are
250. A third mechanism for reversing course is competition. See PIERSON, supra note 63, at 40.
This mechanism seems unlikely to play a role in tax reform.
251. See id.
252. See PIERSON, supra note 63, at 52; Steinmo, supra note 68, at 129.
253. See Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 643,




estimated to cost $704 billion for the five-year period from 2011 through
2015.254
Tax subsidies for homeownership are not only expensive; they are also
too generous in their treatment of housing relative to other investments. As
a result of the subsidies, the effective rate of tax on owner-occupied
housing is near zero or even slightly negative, according to recent
estimates, while the rate of tax on business investment is as high as twenty-
four percent.255 This has led to less business investment, lower
productivity, and ultimately, lower wages and living standards.256
Finally, to return to the idea that an exogenous shock can be a change
agent, tax subsidies for homeownership are inextricably linked with the
housing and finance policies that contributed to the real estate bubble and
global financial crisis. 257 Our foundational assumptions and beliefs about
homeownership have been shaken, and we have a rare and fleeting
opportunity to set a new course. Repealing the gain exclusion for home
sales should be our first step on this new path.
254. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011-2015 36 (Comm. Print) (2012). This figure is comprised of
$464 billion for the home mortgage interest deduction, $123 billion for the exclusion of gains from the
home sales, and $117 for the state and local property tax deduction. See id. Only three other tax
subsidies for individuals are of similar magnitude: The exclusion for employer provided health
insurance ($725 billion); the deferral of tax for employer provided retirement savings ($640 billion);
and the reduced rate of tax on capital gains and dividends ($625 billion). See id. at 42, 43, 37.
255. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 71 (2005) (estimating effective tax rate on
owner occupied housing to be near 0%; on business investment to be 22%); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE RATES AND APPROACHES TO REFORM 8-9 (2005) (estimating
implicit rate of tax on owner occupied housing to be 5.1%; on business investment to be 24.2%).
256. See Robert Carroll, John F. O'Hare & Phillip L. Swagel, Costs and Benefits of Housing Tax
Subsidies, PEW FISCAL ANALYSIS INITIATIVE & SUBSIDYSCOPE 7 (June 2011), http://www.
pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic Mobility/Pew HousingRep
ort.pdf.
257. See id. at 5 (describing how the home mortgage interest deduction leads to excessive
borrowing and how tax subsidies for homeownership lead to overconsumption of housing, both of
which contributed to the real estate bubble); William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-
Davidowitz, Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1187 (2007)
("[T]ax policies toward housing are inequitable, inefficient, and expensive.").
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